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WHLISTLEBLOWER BOUNTY LAWSUITS AS
MONITORING DEVICES IN GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTING
William E. Kovacic*
I. INTRODUCTION
The past quarter century has yielded a substantial literature
concerning the mechanisms by which public legal commands such as
statutes and regulations are enforced. Research in the enforcement
of public law has taken diverse paths. Prominent topics of inquiry
have included private rights of action and reliance on private
monitoring to supplement investigation and prosecution by govern-
ment bodies;' competition among different government entities to
elicit desired levels of enforcement;2 procedural rules to facilitate
public and congressional monitoring of government enforcement
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1. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Roger L. Faith & Robert D.
Tollison, The Pricing of Surrogate Crime and Law Enforcement, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 401
(1983); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); John R. Lott, Jr. & Russell D. Roberts, Why Comply: One-Sided
Enforcement of Price Controls and Victimless Crime Laws, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1989);
A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105
(1980).
2. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAW. 447 (1995);
Richard S. Higgins et al., Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
REGULATION: A VIEW FROM INSIDE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 154 (Robert J.
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agency decision making;3 controls upon judicial discretion to
determine punishment for illegal conduct;4 the impact of adjustments
in the severity and types of penalties upon the efforts of affected
parties to comply with the law;' and incentives to discourage sloth
and corruption and spur optimal monitoring by individual public
employees such as inspectors.
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Since 1980 Congress has enacted numerous measures to improve
enforcement of the legal controls by which the federal government
buys goods and services.' Among other initiatives, Congress has
increased the incentives for-and the ability of-parties other than
government authorities to police adherence to procurement statutes
and regulations. Decentralizing enforcement in public contracting has
taken two forms. The first is enhancing the ability of suppliers to
attack flaws in the processes by which government agencies define
purchasing requirements and award contracts. Adjustments in the
"bid protest" process-chiefly through the Competition in Contracting
Mackay et al. eds., 1987); William E. Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is it Time to End
Dual FederalEnforcement?, ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 1996); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Reforming Public Bureaucracy Through Economic Incentives?, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 131
(1986).
3. See Shane M. Greenstein, Did Installed Base Give an Incumbent Any (Measurable)
Advantages in Federal Computer Procurement?, 24 RAND J. EcoN. 19 (1993); Mathew D.
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
4. See Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional"
About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183 (1991).
5. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994); Warren F. Schwartz & Gordon Tullock, The Costs of a
Legal System, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (1975).
6. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
(1978); DILIP MOOKHERJEE & I.P.L. PNG, CORRUPTIBLE SUPERVISORS AND LAW
ENFORCERS: How SHOULD THEY BE COMPENSATED? (Univ. of Cal. at Los Angeles,
John E. Anderson School of Mgmt., Business Economics Working Paper No. 90-23, Mar.
1991); David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncoopera-
tive Behavior, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 25 (1989).
7. See William E. Kovacic, The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Public Regulation of the
Weapons Acquisition Process, in ARMS, POLITICS, AND THE ECONOMY: HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 104, 105 (Robert Higgs ed., 1990) [hereinafter Kovacic,
Sorcerer's Apprentice]; John W. Whelan, Reflections on Government Contracts and
Government Policy on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Public Contract
Law Section, 20 PUB. CONT. LU. 1 (1990).
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Act of 1984-have increased the number and success rate of supplier
challenges to purchasing agency decisions.9
The second decentralization measure has been to reinvigorate a
Civil War vintage device that gives citizens bounties for attacking
contractor misconduct. In 1986 Congress increased the availability
and attractiveness of qui tam lawsuits by which citizens can enforce
the False Claims Act 0 on behalf of the United States." The 1986
reforms broadened the universe of individuals who can bring bounty
actions and raised the awards for successful qui tam "relators.'
12
Before 1986, limits on whistleblower standing had cut the number of
new qui tam suits to a handful per year. 3 By contrast, from the
effective date of the 1986 amendments through September 1995, over
1105 qui tam actions were filed."4  Table 1 traces the substantial
increase in filings since 1986:
8. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175, 1175-1203 (1984) (codified in various sections
of Titles 10, 31, 40, and 41 of the U.S.C.).
9. See William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid
Protest Disputes, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461 (1995); Robert C. Marshall et al., The Private
Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight by Protest, 20
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1991).
10. Ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863).
11. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986)
(codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994)). The label "qui tam" is a shorthand expression
for the phrase "Qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur," which
means, "Who sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990). For a history of the False Claims Act and its qui tam
provisions, see S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, and Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99
YALE L.J. 341 (1989).
12. Limitations on qui tam standing and remedies that antedated the 1986 reforms are
treated extensively in Caminker, supra note 11, at 380-87; Major John C. Kunich, Qui
Tam: White Knight or Trojan Horse, 33 A.F. L. REv. 31 (1990); Michael L. Waldman, The
1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act: Retroactive or Prospective?, 18 PUB. CONT. L.J.
469 (1989). Among other restrictions, the pre-1986 qui tam regime virtually precluded
suits by government employees, barred actions based upon information already in the
government's possession, and authorized smaller bounties.
13. See Kunich, supra note 12, at 33.
14. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $1 Billion in Qui Tam
Awards and Settlements (Oct. 18,1995), available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 614572 [hereinafter
DOJ, Qui Tam Recoveries]. According to statistics maintained by the Department of
Justice Civil Division, the number of qui tam filings had grown to 1229 as of March 15,
1996. Telephone Interview with Joseph Krovisky, Office of Public Affairs, Department
of Justice (Apr. 22, 1996).
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TABLE 1
Qui Tam Case Filings for Fiscal Years 1987-19951u
FISCAL YEAR NUMBER OF FISCAL YEAR NUMBER OF
CASES FILED CASES FILED
1987 33 1992 119
1988 60 1993 131
1989 95 1994 221
1990 82 1995 274
1991 90 r I
The 1986 reforms stemmed chiefly from fears of rampant defense
procurement fraud.16 As Table 2 shows, most qui tam recoveries
have involved the defense industry. 7 Table 2 also indicates that a
growing number of qui tam recoveries have involved alleged
improprieties by health care providers whose services are reimbursed
through federal insurance programs such as Medicare.18 Federally
funded academic research institutions likewise have emerged as
noteworthy targets of qui tam scrutiny.'9
15. DOJ, Qui Tam Recoveries, supra note 14.
16. See S. REP. No. 345, supra note 11, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267.
17. See Steve France, The Private War on Pentagon Fraud, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at
46; Fred Strasser, When the Big Whistle Blows..., NAT'L L.J., May 8, 1989, at 1, 42.
18. See Kathleen Day, Coming's Metpath Lab Unit Settles Billing Case, WASH. POST,
May 19, 1995, at F3 (describing agreement by medical testing laboratory to pay $8.6
million-including a $1 million felator bounty-to settle charges of billing Medicare and
Medicaid for unperformed tests); Spencer Rich, Blood-Testing Labs Pay U.S. $39.8 Million,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 14, 1993, at A4 (describing payment of $39.8 million by two blood-
testing laboratories to settle charges of fraud in qui tam suit involving blood tests
reimbursed by Medicaid); Calvin Sims, Trying to Mute the Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 1994, at D1 (describing expanded qui tam focus on abuse of federally funded
health care reimbursement programs).
19. See United States ex rel. Condie v. Board of Regents, No. C89-3550-FMS, 1993
WL 740185 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 1993) (alleging that academic researcher misrepresented
data in order to gain federal research grant); Erickson ex rel United States v. American
Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Va. 1989) (alleging fraud in the
performance of a contract to produce a malaria vaccine for the U.S. Agency for
International Development); Katherine Bishop, U.S. Backs Researcher in Suing Ex-
Colleague over Accuracy of Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991, at B5; Ralph Frammolino,
Scientific Fraud Suit to Be Settled for $1.6 Million, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1994, at A37;
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TABLE 2
Patterns of Qui Tam Recoveries'
FISCAL YEAR RECOVERIES RECOVERIES
(DEFENSE) (HEALTH CARE)
(%) (%)
1987 37 16
1988 85 1
1989 79 8
1990 65 3
1991 83 4
1992 70 5
1993 29 46
1994 53 38
1995 48 36
In the coming years three developments promise to spur
continued growth in the number of qui tam suits and the range of
federally funded entities targeted as qui tam defendants. One factor
is the likely increase in the number of private attorneys specializing
in qui tam litigation. The expansion of the qui tam plaintiffs' bar will
come both from private practitioners who retrain themselves to bring
qui tam cases, and from attorneys who have left the government after
working in legal departments-such as the Civil Division of the
Department of Justice (DOJ)-that investigate and prosecute
Malcolm Gladwell & Bill McAllister, U.S. Auditors Say Stanford Overbilling Was $250
Million, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1992, at A21; see also Dan L. Burk, Research Misconduct:
Deviance, Due Process, and the Disestablishment of Science, 3 GEO. MASON INDEPENDENT
L. REV. 305 (1995) (describing application of qui tam False Claims mechanism to research
institutions); Christopher P. Perzan, Note, Research and Relators: The False Claims Act
and Scientific Misconduct, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 639 (1992) (discussing the potential problems
associated with using the qui tam mechanism in a scientific misconduct case).
20. DOJ, Qui Tam Recoveries, supra note 14.
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procurement fraud? l Since 1986 the expansion of qui tam filings and
the substantial publicity surrounding successful practitioners have
fostered the recognition of qui tam litigation as a distinctive and
potentially lucrative practice area.22
A second source of growth in qui tam filings will be greater
public awareness of the qui tam mechanism, caused largely by
publicity concerning the size of relator bounties. According to data
compiled by the DOJ Civil Division, recoveries in qui tam cases from
1986 through September 1995 have totalled approximately $1.06
billion, of which nearly $185 million has been paid in bounties to qui
tam relators.' Table 3 displays the increase in recoveries over time.
Though such awards are hardly routine, there have been a number of
well-publicized bounties of $1 million or more.24 In 1988, before any
21. See France, supra note 17; see also W. John Moore, Citizen Prosecutors, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 18, 1990, at 2006, 2008-09 (describing the growth in participation by established
law firms in representing qui tam relators). The Justice Department's Civil Division is
responsible for determining whether the government will intervene in qui tam lawsuits.
Id. at 2009 (discussing growth in Civil Division resources devoted to reviewing qui tam
complaints); see also infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (describing the Justice
Department's role in qui tam litigation under the False Claims Act).
22. See Gail Diane Cox, A Populist at the Peak, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at CIO
(describing achievements of qui tam plaintiffs' lawyer Herbert Hafif). The establishment
of qui tam litigation as a significant field of legal practice is reflected in the recent
publication of a number of practical texts devoted to the preparation, filing, and defense
of qui tam suits. E.g., JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS
(1993 & Supp. 1995); JAMES B. HELMER, JR. ET AL., FALSE CLAIMS ACT:
WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION (1994); Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act,
1994 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. CONT. LAW PROCUREMENT FRAUD COMM. [hereinafter Qui Tam
Litigation].
23. DOJ, Qui Tam Recoveries, supra note 14. From 1986 through September 1995,
DOJ intervened in or settled qui tam cases resulting in recoveries of $1,058,177,522. Id.
Of this amount, relators received bounties of $184,470,378, or 17.87%, of the government's
proceeds. Iat In cases in which DOJ declined to participate, relators obtained settlements
or judgments of $15,597,141. Id. In these matters, relators received bounties of $3,412,661,
or 28% of the government's proceeds. Id.
24. The largest bounty to date is a reward of $22.5 million to a relator whose qui tam
suit led to the recovery of $150 million from United Technologies for overstating progress
payments submitted by its Sikorsky Aircraft Division to the Department of Defense. Id.;
see also Kunich, supra note 12, at 47-48 (describing qui tam bounty of $1.4 million as part
of a total settlement of $14.3 million with Industrial Tectonics); Moore, supra note 21, at
2006 (reporting qui tam bounty of $2.7 million as part of settlement with manufacturer of
engines for installation on Coast Guard helicopters); Rich, supra note 19 (describing
payment of qui tam bounties of $5.97 million and $15 million to relator whose qui tam suit
challenged fraudulent billing on blood tests reimbursed by Medicare); Sims, supra note 19,
at D1 (recounting multimillion dollar qui tam bounties); GE Agrees to Pay $Z2 Million to
U.S. to Settle Engine Suit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1995, at A2 (reporting payment of $1.7
million bounty to relator whose suit resulted in payment of $7.2 million to government to
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million-dollar bounties had been paid, one plaintiffs' attorney
predicted that, once the first large bounties were realized, the public's
interest in the qui tam mechanism would "explode like the appeal of
the lottery."'
TABLE 3
Trends in Recoveries in Qui Tam Cases for Fiscal Years 1988-199426
FISCAL YEAR RECOVERIES FISCAL YEAR RECOVERIES
(APPROX.) (APPROX.)
(MILLIONS) (MILLIONS)
1988 2 1992 124
1989 32 1993 193
1990 40 1994 379
1991 36 1995 243
The third source of increased qui tam filings will be an expanded
awareness of the full range of contractor conduct that might be
deemed "fraudulent" and thus the basis for a qui tam claim. 7
Principally through broad readings of contractor cost accounting and
information disclosure obligations, government law enforcement
agencies in the past decade have increased the types of contractor
behavior that might be denominated false claims.' The growth of
settle allegations that supplier's jet engines failed to comply with technical specifications);
Guilty Plane-Parts Firm to Pay $18.7 Million, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 9,1991,
at B1 (announcing qui tam bounty of $2 million as part of settlement with manufacturer
of military aircraft fasteners), available in Westlaw, DIALOG, SEATTLEP-I file.
25. Mark Thompson, Stealth Law, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1988, at 33, 34; see also Eletta
Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial
Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273,284-85 (1992)
(stating that financial incentives, when properly structured, are likely to encourage acts of
whistleblowing by individuals who might not otherwise make such disclosures).
26. 1I.
27. See United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 880 F. Supp. 636, 638 (W.D.
Wis. 1995) (rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss qui tam claim predicated on alleged
violation of environmental regulations); Paul W. Morenberg, Environmental Fraud by
Government Contractors: A New Application of the False Claims Act, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 623 (1995) (discussing use of the False Claims Act to attack failures of
government contractors to comply with environmental statutes).
28. See PAUL M. TRUEGER, ACCOUNTING GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
1095 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing a handbook prepared by the Department of Defense
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the plaintiffs' qui tam bar and the success of some relators in
obtaining substantial recoveries have provided the means and
incentive to explore the application of far-reaching theories of fraud
to a wider range of contractor conduct.
The 1986 reforms sought to cure two perceived agency problems:
that contractors exploit private information to shirk their commit-
ments to government customers, and that government law enforce-
ment bodies fail to attack fraud as aggressively as taxpayers would
prefer. Many observers have concluded that the application of the
amended qui tam mechanism has been an unmixed blessing for
taxpayers. Reviewing experience with the 1986 False Claims Act
amendments, Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General for the
DOJ Civil Division, recently observed that "'[t]he recovery of over
$1 billion demonstrates that the public-private partnership encouraged
by the statute works and is an effective tool in our continuing fight
against fraudulent use of public funds."' 29 Noting that "'[t]he qui
tam amendments were intended to encourage private citizens to come
forward with information about fraud against the federal govern-
ment,"' Hunger concluded, "'[o]bviously they are working very
well.' "30
However, sanguine assessments of the qui tam mechanism tend
to ignore two closely related disadvantages of the enforcement
structure established by the 1986 False Claims Act amendments.
First, attempting to curb agency costs in government procurement by
deputizing private individuals can create serious agency problems of
its own. Employees of government contractors, government agencies,
Inspector General that directs Defense Department auditors to treat episodes of defective
pricing as indicators of potential fraud); Allan J. Joseph et al., Update: Defective
Pricing-When Is It Defective? When Is It Fraud?, 54 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 136 (July
30, 1990).
29. DOJ, Qui Tam Recoveries, supra note 14. Assistant Attorney General Hunger's
reference to a "public-private partnership" echoed the sentiments of one of the chief
sponsors of the 1986 False Claims Act amendments. During legislative deliberations
leading to adoption of the 1986 amendments, Iowa senator Charles Grassley noted the
need for "the establishment of a solid partnership between public law enforcers and
private taxpayers" to combat fraud involving government expenditures. 132 CONG. REC.
S11,243 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
30. DOJ, Qui Tam Recoveries, supra note 14. See also Richard B. Schmitt, John
Phillips Fosters A Growing Industry Of Whistle-Blowing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1995,
at Al, A6 (quoting Sen. Charles Grassley, the principal Senate sponsor of the 1986 False
Claims Act amendments: "'The False Claims Act works today just as I had hoped it
would in 1986. ").
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and private firms-all of whom have standing to sue as qui tam
relators-may not invariably act to maximize taxpayer interests. To
evaluate the whistleblower bounty suit as a monitoring device, one
must compare the agency costs of the qui tam process with the agency
costs of alternative monitoring techniques. The likely costs of qui tam
monitoring have yet to receive careful attention in the debate about
bounty hunting as an enforcement tool.
The second disadvantage is the potential of qui tam monitoring
to undermine the attainment of important procurement reform
objectives. A number of observers who endorse the existing False
Claims Act mechanism praise qui tam monitoring for establishing a
"public-private partnership" to punish and deter procurement
fraud.3' The formation of this "partnership" is, however, likely to
impede the development of the purchaser-supplier partnership and the
government's adoption of "commercial practices" that are key aims
of reform initiatives such as the National Performance Review
(NPR).32 As articulated by the NPR, Clinton Administration
procurement policy officials, and a number of congressional officials,
government purchasing agencies should more closely emulate the
contracting techniques of private sector purchasers and establish a
more cooperative relationship with private sector suppliers which do
business with the government. This approach would substitute a
partnership model for relationships characterized by routine ad-
versarial confrontation. The public-private partnership embodied in
the existing system of False Claims Act qui tam monitoring and the
purchaser-supplier partnership envisioned by the NPR reforms cannot
coexist. Private purchasers do not routinely-if ever-condition their
31. See, e.g., id. (quoting Assistant Attorney General Hunger as saying that the
recovery of more than $1 billion in qui tam suits since 1986" 'demonstrates that the public-
private partnership encouraged by the statute works."' Id.
32. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING
A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COsTS LESS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
PERFORMANCE REVIEW (1993) [hereinafter NPR REPORT]. One goal of the NPR is to
rewrite the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) to "foster competitiveness and
commercial practices." IL at 28; see also Agencies Asked to Test Evaluation Subfactor to
Reward Contractors Who Suggest Ways to Improve RFPs, 63 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 10
(Jan. 9, 1995) (describing efforts by Office of Federal Procurement Policy administrator
Steven Kelman to improve government-industry communications during the procurement
process because such communications enhance the partnership relationship between the
government and its suppliers); Agencies Signing Up to Make Past Performance an
Evaluation Factor on Selected Procurements, 60 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 605 (Dec. 13,
1993) (describing goal of Office of Federal Procurement Policy administrator Steven
Kelman to foster a partnership between the government and its suppliers).
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willingness to buy upon the supplier's willingness to deputize its own
workforce, and all others who have contact with the supplier, to
detect deviations from contractual terms and sue the supplier on the
purchaser's behalf. For a private purchaser even to suggest such a
device for monitoring contractual compliance almost certainly would
cause the vast majority of prospective suppliers to walk away. So
long as the government insists on the existing scheme of qui tam
monitoring, which grants standing to supplier and government
employees, 3 it will never form the type of partnerships to which the
NPR aspires.
This Article considers the efficiency consequences of
whistleblower bounty suits in four Parts. It begins in Part II by
presenting the efficiency aims of the procurement process and qui tam
monitoring. Part III outlines the qui tam mechanism and judicial
interpretations of its chief provisions. Part IV describes the efficiency
costs and benefits of qui tam monitoring. The Article concludes by
presenting a framework for determining the qui tam system's net
efficiency effects and by proposing adjustments in the existing scheme
of qui tam incentives and administration.
II. THE EFFICIENCY GOALS OF THE PUBLIC CONTRACTING
REGULATORY SCHEME AND THE QuI TAM CAUSE OF ACTION
Although efficiency has received great attention in recent
proposals to reform the procurement process," to discuss the
efficiency implications of qui tam monitoring does not mean that
efficiency is the sole or paramount concern of the procurement
process. Efficiency is but one of a number of goals that federal
procurement regulations attempt to achieve. The objective of
achieving the highest quality goods and services at the lowest possible
price coexists with a number of other objectives, notably wealth
redistribution.35
To the extent that efficiency matters in public procurement, the
1986 qui tam reforms might serve essentially three efficiency-related
purposes. The first is to punish and deter corruption that decreases
the amount and quality of goods and services that the government
receives for a given level of outlays. The second is to sustain taxpayer
33. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
34. See NPR REPORT, supra note 32, at 1-9.
35. See Kovacic, Sorcerer's Apprentice, supra note 7, at 110-11.
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support for needed public programs by signalling that the government
is aggressively trying to obtain full value for its expenditures. The
third is to reduce the cost of oversight by relying more heavily on
private parties who can perform monitoring functions at lower cost
than government authorities. This Article examines the qui tam
reforms in light of their ability to attain these efficiency objectives.
III. THE Qui TAM MECHANISM OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT:
CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION
Oversight devices that give third parties bounties to monitor
compliance with public legal requirements are not unique to govern-
ment contracting. Among other areas, decentralized monitoring and
enforcement are important elements of federal statutes and regula-
tions dealing with antitrust,36 consumer protection,37 environmental
policy,38 equal employment opportunity,39 securities," and taxa-
tion.4 These decentralized enforcement regimes share important
characteristics of qui tam monitoring for public contracts. However,
the procurement qui tam system has features that, taken as a whole,
are unique in decentralized enforcement. The qui tam mechanism is
distinctive because it applies to an especially wide range of conduct,
it deputizes an unusually broad universe of individuals to sue on the
government's behal and it offers successful relators more generous
bounties. The 1986 qui tam reforms created the most potent
decentralized monitoring system in American public law.
36. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1994) (creating private rights of action under federal
antitrust laws).
37. See id. § 2060(a) (citizen-suit provision of the Consumer Product Safety Act).
38. Numerous federal environmental statutes authorize citizen suits. See Robert F.
Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement
Under the Clean Water Act Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Independent Values,
22 GA. L. REv. 337, 367 & n.95, 368 (1988); Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement
of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REv. 339,340 & n.5, 341 (1990). Noteworthy examples
include 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) (citizen-suit provision of Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972 (1994) (citizen-suit provision of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (1989) (citizen-suit provision of Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988)
(citizen-suit provision of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
40. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, § 21A(e), 102 Stat. 4677, 4679.
41. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623-1 (1995) (allowing payment of bounties to individuals who
provide information leading to recovery of underpaid taxes).
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As a foundation for assessing its efficiency consequences, this
Part describes the qui tam mechanism and indicates how courts have
interpreted its chief operative features.42 The treatment of judicial
views does not present each nuance or competing perspective that has
emerged in the courts since 1986, nor does it analyze the extensive
litigation that has focused on the constitutionality of the amended
False Claims Act.43 Rather, the discussion addresses various judicial
interpretations of the 1986 amendments that have especially important
incentive and efficiency consequences.
A. Prohibited Conduct
The False Claims Act creates civil liability for any person who
knowingly submits a false claim for payment to the federal govern-
ment, knowingly uses a false statement to induce the government to
pay a false claim, conspires to defraud the government to pay a false
claim, or knowingly uses a false statement to decrease an obligation
to pay money to the government.' "Claims" include all requests for
payment of money or property where the federal government pays for
42. For fuller treatments of the 1986 False Claims Act amendments and their judicial
interpretations, see Thomas P. Barletta & Barbara A. Pollack, Civil Litigation of
Allegations of Fraud in Connection with Government Contract Claims, 18 PUB. CoNT. L.J.
235,244-48,257-59 (1988); James Dever, Double Jeopardy, False Claims, and United States
v. Halper, 20 PUB. CONT. Li. 56, 60-68 (1990); James J. Graham, The Qui Tam
Amendments: Privatizing the Civil Prosecution Function, 49 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 659,
659-60 (Apr. 4, 1988); Kunich, supra note 12, at 33-36; Richard J. Oparil, The Coming
Impact of the Amended False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REV. 525,525-33 (1989); Waldman,
supra note 12, at 471-75.
43. See, e.g., United States ex rel Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co., 41
F.3d 1032, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that False Claims Act qui tam mechanism did not
violate separation of powers principle); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d
743, 748-60 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting various challenges to constitutionality of qui tam
mechanism), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994); United States er rel. Truong v. Northrop
Corp., 728 F. Supp. 615, 620-22 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that qui tam mechanism did not
undermine executive branch powers so much as to violate separation of powers doctrine);
United States ex reL Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 610-15
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (stating that qui tam mechanism did not violate separation of powers
principle or the Appointments Clause); United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes
Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1095-96 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (stating that qui tam
mechanism did not violate separation of powers principle or the Appointments Clause).
For discussions of the constitutionality of the amended False Claims Act, see Caminker,
supra note 11; James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui
Tam Provision, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 701 (1993); Robert E. Johnston, Note, 1001
Attorneys GeneraL" Executive-Employee Qui Tam Suits and the Constitution, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 609 (1994).
44. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
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any part of the money or property in question.45 "Knowing" conduct
embraces actual knowledge of a falsehood, as well as "deliberate
ignorance" or "reckless disregard" of the truth.46
The qui tam mechanism's significance depends largely upon what
conduct constitutes a false claim. Implementation of the 1986 qui tam
reforms coincided with a major expansion of the types of conduct
regarded as fraudulent under the False Claims Act. This expansion
has two sources. The first is a large increase, through administrative
interpretation and enforcement policy, of contractor obligations under
existing statutes. For example, the Truth in Negotiations Act47
requires firms to disclose cost and pricing data prior to the agreement
on price for certain negotiated contracts.48 Violations of this
disclosure obligation are commonly treated as evidence of civil or
criminal fraud.49
The second formative development is the creation of new
regulatory requirements of which an infraction may constitute a false
claim. Modem procurement reforms often compel contractors to
submit certificates attesting to compliance with regulatory com-
mands.5 o Signing a certificate whose underlying representations are
known,to be incorrect can not only be prosecuted as a false statement
to a federal agency,5' but each request for payment under a contract
for which a false certificate is signed can be attacked as a false claim.
Since 1980 the number and complexity of mandatory certifications has
risen dramatically. 2 This trend has produced a corresponding
45. IL § 3729(c).
46. Id. § 3729(b).
47. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a (1994).
48. See CLARENCE T. KIpPS, JR. & JOHN LLOYD RICE, LIVING WITH TINA: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT 1-2, 23-28 (1989).
49. See TRUEGER, supra note 28, at 1235, 1245-48; Joseph et al., supra note 28, at 145-
47; Steven D. Overly, Government Contractors, Beware: Civil and Criminal Penalties
Abound for Defective Pricing, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 597, 600-01 (1987); W. Bruce Shirk
et al., Truth or Consequences: Expanding Civil and Criminal Liability for the Defective
Pricing of Government Contracts, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 935, 936-39 (1988).
50. See William E. Kovacic, Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in Government
Procurement, 25 POL'Y SCI. 29, 31-32 (1992) [hereinafter Kovacic, Regulatory Controls].
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (prohibiting the knowing or wilful submission of false
declarations to federal departments or agencies).
52. See BRIAN C. ELMER ET AL., GOVERNMENT CONTRACT FRAUD 6.2-6.17 (1985);
John E. Cavanagh, Can Procurement Ethics Laws Be Cost Effective?, CHANGING
TIMES/CHANGING ETHICAL RELATIONSHIPS: WHAT'S ACCEPTABLE & WHAT'S NOT?,
1990 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. CONT. LAW, Tab D, at 4-17.
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increase in the number of events that could elicit scrutiny by a qui
tam relator.
B. Relator Standing
The qui tam mechanism allows any "private person" to bring a
civil action to remedy violations of the False Claims Act.5 3 In
general, the statute's language, legislative history, and interpretation
by federal judges appear to give standing to private citizens, employ-
ees of government contractors, employees of government agencies,
and private companies.54 Thus, a recipient of federal funds is subject
to qui tam monitoring and lawsuits by the recipient's own employees
(such as managers, assembly line workers, secretaries, and research
assistants), government employees (including auditors, inspectors,
attorneys, and purchasing agency program managers), and private
firms (including suppliers and competitors).
The permissive qui tam standing requirements contrast with other
decentralized schemes for monitoring compliance with federal laws.
Antitrust doctrine imposes formidable standing limitations upon
private plaintiffs5 and typically denies standing to employees who
allege that their employers have engaged in conduct that restricts
competition in product markets in which the employers sell their
goods.5 6 The private cause of action for employment discrimination
53. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1994). The Senate report accompanying the 1986 reforms
expressed Congress's desire "to encourage any individual knowing of Government fraud
to bring that information forward." S. REP. No. 345, supra note 11, at 6, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266-67.
54. See Kenneth D. Brody, Recent Developments in the Area of "Qui Tam" Lawsuits,
37 FED. B. NEws & J. 592, 592 (1990); Kunich, supra note 12, at 33, 40-41.
55. William Page demonstrates that judicial retrenchment of modem antitrust doctrine
has resulted less from direct adjustments in substantive liability standards and more from
the imposition of restrictive standing and injury tests for private plaintiffs. See William H.
Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1268-78 (1989). This
development was possible because the general terminology of the principal antitrust
statutes gives courts broad discretion to expand or contract liability, standing, and injury
requirements. See William E. Kovacic, The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law, 30
ECON. INQUIRY 294, 295 (1992). By contrast, the public procurement regulatory regime,
including the 1986 qui tam reforms, gives federal judges considerably less discretion to
interpret important provisions.
56. See II PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 312 (rev. ed. 1995)
(observing that, in antitrust cases, "[e]mployees have usually been denied standing to
challenge restraints on competition in the downstream market in which their employers
sell"). The logic of this approach is that employees of antitrust violators benefit from, and
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under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964s7 limits private
standing to individuals who have wrongfully been denied employ-
ment. 8 Internal Revenue Service tax regulations that authorize
bounties for informers deny eligibility to employees of the Depart-
ment of the Treasury or any other federal employee who acquired
information relating to tax underpayments in the course of their
official duties.59
Government contractors have tried unsuccessfully to persuade the
federal courts to place comparably restrictive standing hurdles in the
path of qui tam litigants. In particular, courts have rejected the
argument that the 1986 qui tam reforms improperly purported to give
standing to relators who do not satisfy constitutional standing
requirements of injury in fact and causation.' As interpreted by the
courts, the qui tam mechanism grants standing to an incomparably
broad range of individuals, including employees of government
contractors and employees of government agencies alike.
The broad grant of qui tam standing in the False Claims Act is
subject to four qualifications. The statute requires courts to reject
jurisdiction over suits:
(1) "[B]rought by a former or present member of the
armed forces... against a member of the armed forces
arising out of such person's service in the armed
forces."'"
(2) "[B]rought ... against a Member of Congress, a
member of the judiciary, or a senior executive branch
official if the action is based on evidence or information
are not injured by, anticompetitive conduct. See Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d
1344, 1352 (6th Cir. 1989) (denying standing to employees who challenge their employer's
alleged antitrust violations, observing that employees would have been economic
beneficiaries of their employer's anticompetitive conduct), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
58. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
59. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623-1 (1995).
60. The lower courts have concluded that allegations of injury to the United States
government suffice to establish the relator's standing to sue on the government's behalf.
See, eg., United States ex rel Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that relator had sufficient interest in outcome of qui tam suit to satisfy standing
requirement under Article III of the U.S. Constitution), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125
(1994). For discussions of constitutional challenges to relator standing, see Thomas R.
Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the False Claims Act, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 543 (1990); Valerie R. Park, Note, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and
the Government: Which is the Real Party to the Action?, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1061 (1991).
61. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1) (1994).
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known to the Government when the action was
brought."'62
(3) "[B]ased upon allegations or transactions which are the
subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money
penalty proceeding in which the Government is already
a party.
63
(4) "[B]ased upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative
hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Govern-
ment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action
is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the informa-
tion."'
The "original source" exception to the last of these limitations applies
to an individual who has "direct and independent knowledge of the
information on which the allegations are based, and has voluntarily
provided such information to the Government before filing an action"
which is based on the information.65
62. 1& § 3730(e)(2)(A).
63. Id. § 3730(e)(3).
64. Id § 3730(e)(4)(A). The courts have given a broad reading to the meaning of civil
"hearing" in interpreting the reach of the public disclosure bar in § 3730(e)(4)(A). The
courts of appeals uniformly have concluded that any information disclosed through civil
litigation and placed on file with the clerk's office should be considered a public disclosure.
United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994); United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14
F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States ex reL Kreindler & Kreindler v. United
Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2962 (1993);
United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944
F.2d 1149, 1154-56 (3d Cir. 1991); see United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus.,
971 F.2d 548, 554 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 951 (1993). The courts also
have ruled that § 3730(e)(4)(A) neither bars the use of evidence "publicly disclosed" for
the first time during the discovery phase of the qui tam suit, Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d
1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992), nor precludes the use of evidence disclosed in the course of a
criminal investigation initiated by the government on the basis of information provided by
the qui tam relator, see United States ex reL Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 5 F.3d 407,411-12
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1543 (1994).
65. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Compare United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that to be an "original source" within
the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A), qui tam plaintiffs must have "direct and independent
knowledge of information on which the allegations are based," must have provided that
information to the government, and must have been a "source to the entity that publicly
disclosed the allegations" on which the qui tam suit was based); Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418
(same) with United States ex reL Siller, 21 F.3d at 1351-55 (rejecting view of Second and
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The "public disclosure" restriction has proven to be the greatest
jurisdictional barrier for qui tam relators.66 Courts have used this
restriction to refuse jurisdiction over suits when the information sup-
porting the relator's complaint already is in the public domain and the
relator lacks direct, independent knowledge of the information.67
For example, courts have dismissed qui tam lawsuits grounded chiefly
on information obtained from discovery in other lawsuits,
68
complaints filed in other lawsuits,69 or trial records of other cases.7'
Ninth Circuits that qui tam relator cannot be an original source unless the relator was a
source to the entity that publicly disclosed the information on which the qui tam suit was
based).
66. See Robert L. Vogel, The Public Disclosure Bar Against Qui Tam Suits, 24 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 477, 491-99 (1995) (discussing judicial decisions interpreting the public
disclosure limitation).
67. The majority interpretation of the public disclosure'bar views qui tam actions as
"based upon" a public disclosure whenever the factual basis for the relator's suit has been
revealed in the public domain, regardless of whether the relator in fact derived knowledge
of the facts from that disclosure. See United States ex rel Springfield Terminal Ry., 14 F.3d
at 652-55; United States ex rel Kreindler & Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1158; United States ex reL
Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 552; United States ex rel Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318,
324 (2d Cir. 1992). The minority view entertains an inquiry into whether the relator
derived knowledge from sources other than the previous public disclosure. See United
States ex reL Siller, 21 F.3d at 1348-50.
68. See United States ex rel Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1159-60. In Stinson the qui tam
relator was a law firm that had obtained information concerning an insurance company's
participation in a Medicaid fraud scheme. Id. at 1150-51. The law firm obtained the
information through discovery in an unrelated lawsuit. Id. at 1151. The court ruled that
because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ordinarily permit public scrutiny of data
collected in discovery-even if such scrutiny never actually occurs-the information in
question had been publicly disclosed within the meaning of the False Claims Act. Id. at
1159-60. The court also found that the law firm was not an original source of the Medicaid
fraud information because it had obtained the data fortuitously through discovery and not
through a deliberate search for the data. Id. at 1161.
69. See, eg., United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d
Cir. 1990). In Long Island Lighting the qui tam relators were employees of an architect-
engineering firm responsible for designing the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Id at 14.
The relators alleged that the utility lied to the New York Public Service Commission about
Shoreham's construction status. Id This falsehood was said to have gained the
Commission's consent to higher rates, which defrauded the federal government as one of
the utility's ratepayers. Id The court concluded that the relators' qui tam complaint
largely copied allegations from an earlier RICO complaint that Suffolk County had filed
against the Long Island Lighting Company. Id. The court also said the relators did not
qualify for the "original source" exception because they were not the source of the
information to the entity-Suffolk County-that first disclosed the data. Id at 18. But
cf. United States ex rel Siller, 21 F.3d at 1347-55 (refusing to assume that relator's qui tam
allegations were based on disclosures contained in complaint in separate, earlier lawsuit
against defendant solely on basis that relator's allegations were similar to those made in
the earlier lawsuit).
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The public disclosure restriction seeks to discourage "parasitic"
lawsuits that constitute additional, cumulative assaults upon contractor
conduct that is already the target of legal challenge.7'
One of the most contentious standing issues has been whether
government employees may bring qui tam suits based on information
obtained during their public employment.72 The DOJ has argued
that government employees should be precluded from pursuing such
suits. 3 Although some judicial decisions have disfavored qui tam
suits by current or former government employees,74 most courts have
declined to bar government employees from bringing qui tam actions
so long as the information supporting the allegations was not in the
public domain when the suit was filed.75 One important court of
appeals decision concluded that the 1986 qui tam reforms do not
compel government employees to await the end of a nonpublic,
internal government investigation before starting qui tam actions.
76
Without avail, the DOJ argued that permitting such lawsuits would
trigger races to the courthouse in which government employees seek
70. See Houck ex rel United States v. Folding Carton Admin., 881 F.2d 494, 504-05
(7th Cir. 1989) (dismissing qui tam suit because the information supporting the complaint
was derived from earlier litigation resulting in a reported decision), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1026 (1990).
71. See United States ex rel. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1154 (discussing congressional intent
to discourage suits based on previous disclosures of fraud).
72. See Dorothea Beane, Qui Tam Actions: Are Government Employees Proper Qui
Tam Plaintiffs?, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 279 (1993); Joan R. Bullock, The Pebble in the Shoe:
Making the Case for the Government Employee, 60 TENN. L. REv. 365 (1993); Patrick W.
Hanifan, Qui Tam Suits by Federal Government Employees Based on Government
Information, 20 PU. CONT. L.J. 556 (1990).
73. See Howard Mintz, DOJ Policy Stiffs Stanford Whistleblower, LEGAL TIMES, Jan.
20, 1992, at 2 (discussing DOJ efforts to preclude federal employees from serving as qui
tam relators). In adopting the 1986 False Claims Act amendments, Congress appears not
to have anticipated the possibility that government employees would seek to act as
relators. Mintz, supra, at 21 (quoting Rep. Howard Berman: "'I'm embarrassed to say
we did not spend any time ... contemplating this question.' ").
74. See United States ex reL Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., 72 F.3d 740,745 (9th Cir. 1995)
(barring employee of Inspector General's office from bringing qui tam suit); United States
ex reL LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding government
employee not to be proper relator where duties involved investigating fraud), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 921 (1991).
75. See United States ex rel Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11th Cir.
1991); United States ex tel Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416,
1419-20 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158,1161 (S.D.
Fla. 1990), rev'd in part, vacated in par4 without op., 958 F.2d 1082 (11th Cir. 1992);
Erickson ex rel United States v. American Inst. of Bio. Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 912-15
(E.D. Va. 1989),
76. United States ex rel Williams, 931 F.2d at 1503-04.
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to file qui tam lawsuits based on information acquired in their official
duties before the government can start a civil or criminal case in its
own right.77
C. The Government's Role in a Qui Tam Suit
The relator begins a qui tam action by serving the DOJ with a
copy of the complaint and "written disclosure of substantially all
material evidence and information the person possesses. '78  The
complaint is placed under seal with the court for at least sixty days
and is not served on the defendant until sixty days elapse.79 The
waiting period allows the DOJ to investigate and evaluate the
relator's allegations. The DOJ may seek-and often ob-
tains-extensions of the sixty-day waiting period.s° After reviewing
the relator's complaint, the DOJ has four options: take over the suit
and prosecute the action;"' decline to participate and allow the
relator to proceed independently, while retaining the right to
intervene at a later stage of the proceedings;' move that the court
dismiss the action following notice to the relator and an opportunity
for the relator to be heard;' and, subject to the court's approval,
settle the action following notice to the relator and an opportunity for
the relator to critique the proposed settlement terms. 4
Relators have initiated 1229 suits since the effective date of the
1986 qui tam reforms through March 15, 1996.85 The DOJ has
settled or intervened in and prosecuted 198 qui tam suits.8 6 In 688
cases the DOJ declined to participate and allowed the relator to
proceed independently.' The remaining 343 matters are under
77. Id. at 1503.
78. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1994).
79. It
80. ld. § 3730(b)(3)-(4).
81. I& § 3730(b)(4)(A).
82. 1& § 3730(b)(4)(B).
83. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
84. It § 3730(c)(2)(B). For a discussion of the Justice Department's role in the
prosecution of qui tam suits, see Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The
Department of Justice's Command Performance Under The 1986 False Claims Amendments
Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 409 (1993).
85. See DOJ, Qui Tam Recoveries, supra note 14; Telephone Interview with Joseph
Krovisky, supra note 14.
86. Telephone Interview with Joseph Krovisky, supra note 14. The total of 198 cases
includes 151 completed matters and 47 active matters.
87. Id. In 463 of the 688 cases in which the Justice Department declined to
participate, the court subsequently dismissed the qui tam claims with no recovery to the
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investigation, and the DOJ has not yet decided whether to inter-
vene.88  The DOJ appears, in effect, to have adopted a policy of
seeking dismissal of a qui tam suit only when there is a jurisdictional
flaw in the relator's suit-for example, reliance on publicly available
information.' There has been only a single reported instance in
which the DOJ has sought to dismiss a qui tam suit on the ground
that the suit lacked substantive merit or otherwise contradicted the
interests of the United States.9"
D. The Relator's Bounty
The False Claims Act penalizes violations with (1) a civil penalty
between $5000 and $10,000 for each violation91 and (2) three times
the actual damage the government has sustained from the defendant's
misconduct." The relator's share in the recovery depends chiefly
upon whether the DOJ intervenes to prosecute the case and whether
the relator participated in the conduct that forms the basis of the qui
tam suit. If the DOJ prosecutes the qui tam action, the relator
receives fifteen to twenty-five percent of the recovery, plus reasonable
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.93 The size of the bounty within
this range depends upon "the extent to which the person substantially
relator. In 31 of the 688 cases, the relator achieved a recovery by way of settlement or
judgment. 117 cases remain in litigation.
88. Id.
89. See infra note 160 and accompanying text (describing testimony by Stuart M.
Gerson, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, outlining the Justice
Department's opposition to qui tam suits by government employees).
90. See DOJ Says It Can Stop Whistleblower Suits, DOJ ALERT, Nov. 21, 1994, at 9,
9 (discussing United States ex reL Sequoia Orange Co. v. San Joaquin Citrus & Sunkist
Growers, Inc., No. CV-F-89-002 (E.D. Cal. 1989)). In Sequoia Orange the DOJ Civil
Division sought to dismiss a qui tam challenge to alleged violations of agricultural
marketing orders administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Invoking
its authority under 31 U.S.C. § 3710(c)(2)(A), the DOJ sought dismissal on the ground that
a new USDA policy governing citrus production could not be implemented if the suit
proceeded. DOJ Says It Can Stop Whistleblower Suits, supra, at 10. The district court
later granted the government's request to dismiss the suit. See United States ex ret.
Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325,1352-54 (E.D. Cal.
1995).
91. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994). Each invoice submitted for payment under a fraud-
ulently obtained or fraudulently priced contract is a separate violation. If the contractor
submits monthly vouchers for payment under a tainted contract, each voucher is a separate
offense against which the fixed civil penalty can be assessed.
92. Id. The False Claims Act provides for double damages in some instances where
the defendant voluntarily discloses fraud to the government. Id. § 3729(a)(7).
93. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
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contributed to the prosecution of the action."94 The court may limit
the bounty to ten percent or less of the recovery if the action rested
mainly on public disclosures of information-other than information
provided by the relator-concerning "allegations or transactions in a
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, adminis-
trative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media." 95 If the DOJ does not
prosecute the action, the bounty rises to twenty-five to thirty percent
of the recovery, plus reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expens-
es.
9 6
A generous bounty may be necessary to induce some relators to
liquidate their investment in a career with their current employer. As
described below, the False Claims Act's anti-retaliation safeguards
give relators some protection against retribution from their employers.
Such safeguards may shield a relator from outright dismissal, but they
will not quell the institutional hostility that filing a qui tam suit likely
will arouse. A potential relator probably must assume that filing a
qui tam case will preclude future advancement in the firm and,
perhaps, in the industry. A relator with a promising professional
future is unlikely to sue unless the prospective gain from the suit
exceeds the expected gains from continued service with the firm or in
the profession. At the same time, there is another pool of potential
relators who probably would require a less generous bounty. The
dramatic contraction of the defense industry since the late 1980s has
displaced hundreds of thousands of workers and put the jobs of many
others at risk.97 Employees who have been dismissed, or face
imminent layoffs, have less to lose in pursuing a qui tam suit and are
likely to demand a smaller return from a qui tam suit than employees
who otherwise anticipate an extended career with the firm.
The 1986 qui tam reforms sought to protect employees who are
"discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any
other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of
employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by
the employee on behalf of the employee or others" in pursuing a qui
94. Id
95. Id
96. Id § 3730(d)(2).
97. See, e.g., James Flanigan, 'Peace Dividend' Holds a Challenge, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
22,1991, at D1; William Hamilton, Remembering Its Strengths, California Starts to Recover,
WASH. POST, June 22, 1994, at Al; Peter Hecht, Defense Workers Ask Gore for Jobs,
SACRAMENTO BEE, June 23, 1993, at A3.
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tam action." Protected conduct includes investigating, initiating,
testifying for, or otherwise assisting in a qui tam action. The statute
entitles the retaliation target "to all relief necessary to make the
employee whole."99  Such relief includes restoring seniority, two
times back pay, interest on back pay, special damages, litigation costs,
and reasonable attorneys fees.'O
The False Claims Act curtails, and sometimes precludes,
recoveries by relators who participate in misconduct that supports the
qui tam complaint The relator cannot recover a bounty if convicted
of criminal conduct that also violates the False Claims Act. 1 In the
absence of a criminal conviction, the court may reduce the bounty of
relators who plan and initiate violations."°  The reduction must
account for the relator's role "in advancing the case to litigation and
any relevant circumstances pertaining to the violation."'"
E. Controls Upon Baseless, Abusive, or Frivolous Actions
The 1986 qui tam reforms provide several deterrents to the filing
or continuation of meritless, abusive, or frivolous cases. As suggested
earlier, the statute gives the DOJ an important gatekeeping function
by permitting the DOJ to move to dismiss suits it deems meritless 1'
Nonetheless, the DOJ seldom has moved to dismiss a qui tam suit on
the ground that the underlying substantive allegations were thread-
bare. Short of seeking outright dismissal, the DOJ also can move to
restrict the relator's participation where the DOJ chooses to prosecute
the case. 5 This option lets the DOJ prevent the relator from
pursuing duplicative or fruitless evidentiary paths.
The 1986 reforms also allow defendants to move to restrict
abusive or frivolous relator conduct. The court may limit the relator's
participation if the defendant shows that unrestricted participation
"would be for the purposes of harassment or would cause the
defendant undue burden or unnecessary expense."106 In addition,
if the DOJ does not prosecute the case and the telator proceeds
98. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
99. I&
100. Id.
101. I& § 3730(d)(3).
102. Id.
103. I&
104. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
105. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
106. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(D).
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independently, the court may award the defendant reasonable
attorneys' fees and expenses "if the defendant prevails in the action
and the court finds that the claim of the person bringing the action
was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for
purposes of harassment."'" Through September 1995 there has
been only a single reported instance in which a defendant has
successfully invoked either of these provisions."8
IV. EFFICIENCY CONSEQUENCES OF QuI TAM ACTIONS
Congressional sponsors of the 1986 qui tam reforms saw bounty
hunting as a valuable spur for efficiency in public procurement.'09
The prospect of increasing the amount and quality of goods and
services for a given level of expenditures provided crucial impetus for
enhancing the qui tam 'mechanism. This Section examines the
efficiency considerations that weigh in favor of and against the
enhanced bounty hunting provisions.
A. Benefits of Qui Tam Actions
The 1986 qui tam reforms arose largely from the widespread
perception that contractors often overcharged government agencies
for goods and services and routinely shirked in performing contractual
quality inspections. ° Sponsors of the reforms believed that the
frequency of overcharging and quality shirking stemmed from
deficient government monitoring and enforcement of compliance with
procurement regulations and statutes."' The qui tam reforms seek
to improve the detection and deterrence of contractor fraud by
reducing agency costs associated with, respectively, purchasing agency-
contractor and enforcement agency-taxpayer relationships.
1. Proximity to relevant information
The chief efficiency advantage of qui tam bounty hunting is that
it gives oversight and enforcement powers to those closest to the
107. Id. § 3730(d)(4).
108. See United States ex reL Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences, Civ. A. No. 90-
2568, 1992 WL 247587, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1992) (imposing sanctions under
§ 3730(d)(4) where qui tam plaintiff failed to state valid federal claim and filed suit to
harass the defendant).
109. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
110. See Caminker, supra note 11, at 349.
111. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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relevant information."' Principal-agent models used to analyze
public contracting often feature a supplier with private information
about its costs and its efforts to provide quality."' Typically,
information asymmetries are greatest for suppliers with sole-source
contracts to provide nonstandard products such as weapons sys-
tems. 14 The government relies extensively upon ex-ante and ex-post
audits and inspections by public employees to press its agents to
reveal their true costs and to meet quality requirements." 5
Audits and inspections can be costly, however, and even arduous
examination schemes may fail to equip external government observers
with the same knowledge possessed by internal contractor employ-
ees."6 Due to greater familiarity with, and understanding of, the
contractor's activities, contractor employees ordinarily can identify
and assess relevant information at a lower cost than external
government observers. Compared to a government auditor, assembly
line workers will be first to know that supervisors have instructed
employees to take labor hours properly attributable to a fixed-price
government contract and charge them to a cost-plus project.
Compared to a government inspector, quality control engineers can
more readily detect the deliberate omission of mandatory product
tests or tampering with test results. Compared to a government
purchasing official, a supplier's cost analyst can more easily detect
that the firm's sealed bid was part of a covertly-orchestrated bid
rotation scheme.
2. Antidote to deficient public agency incentives
Adopting decentralized enforcement mechanisms also flows from
112. The Senate report on the 1986 qui tam reforms said enhanced qui tam monitoring
was "necessary to halt the so-called 'conspiracy of silence' that has allowed fraud against
the Government to flourish." S. REP. No. 345, supra note 11, at 6, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5271.
113. See David P. Baron & David Besanko, Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric
Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting, 18 RAND J. ECON. 509 (1987).
114. See Key-suk Kim & Mark A. Zupan, The Role of Vendor Past Performance in
Defense Contract Awards: Some Empirical Evidence 8-9 (Dec. 1990) (unpublished
working paper, Univ. of S. Cal. School of Bus. Admin., on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review).
115. See FRANK M. ALSTON ET AL., CONTRACrING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT 23-26 (1st ed. 1984); TRUEGER, supra note 28, at 19-47.
116. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN
PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 3 (1993); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Using
Cost Observation to Regulate Firms, 94 J. POL. ECON. 614 (1986).
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doubts about how closely the incentives of public purchasing
authorities and enforcement agencies are aligned with taxpayer
interests."7 The 1986 qui tam reforms consciously tried to reduce
reliance on public authorities that, for various institutional reasons,
might not attack contractor misconduct aggressively."' When it
detects supplier fraud, a government purchasing body might forego
prosecution for fear that any scandal will endanger funding for
favored programs, or because the firm has captured its regulator." 9
These tendencies are partly offset by placing the decision to prosecute
fraud in the hands of the Justice Department, which presumably is
less concerned about the fate of individual purchasing agency projects
or suppliers. Yet without decentralized monitoring that brings fraud
allegations directly to its attention, the DOJ might depend excessively
upon purchasing agencies whose interests could dictate suppression of
information needed to begin and develop investigations. Moreover,
the DOJ also might withhold aggressive inquiry if members of
Congress or the President apply pressure to protect specific acquisi-
tion programs.
The decentralization approach of the 1986 qui tam reforms
counteracts the possibility of inadequate public enforcement in three
ways. First, it gives the DOJ greater access to fraud-related informa-
tion that government purchasing agencies might pursue halfheartedly,
and never discover, or suppress. By compelling relators to serve the
DOJ with their complaints and supporting data, the qui tam process
provides a tripwire for alerting the DOJ to misconduct that purchas-
ing agencies might not bring to its attention.
Second, by deputizing contractor employees and government
employees to sue on the government's behalf the qui tam mechanism
decreases the likelihood that meritorious cases will languish because
the purchasing agency or DOJ, owing to sloth, negligence, or
117. See Marshall et al., supra note 9, at 3.
118. During hearings on the 1986 qui tam reforms, one of the chief sponsors of the
False Claims Act amendments stated that "[w]hether as a result of lack of resources, or
worse, the Department of Justice has not done an acceptable job of prosecuting defense
contractor fraud." False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1986) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman).
119. See WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX 327-47 (1986);
MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, THE WHISTLE-BLOWERS:
EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 20-21 (1989); Patrick J.
DeSouza, Note, Regulating Fraud in Military Procurement: A Legal Process Model, 95
YALE L.J. 390, 399-401 (1985).
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deliberate policy choices designed to protect specific programs from
needed scrutiny, declines to investigate and attack apparent episodes
of fraud. Perhaps most important, the qui tam reforms permit
government employees-including employees of prosecutorial bureaus
such as the DOJ-to second-guess internal government decisions not
to prosecute where such decisions may be the result of capture or
corruption.
Third, scholars have suggested that one way to reduce corruption
and discourage shirking by public inspectors is to increase their stake
in amounts the government recovers by identifying and challenging
violations of legal requirements." Allowing qui tam suits by
government employees such as auditors and inspectors may reduce
the likelihood that individual employees will be captured or corrupted
by firms they oversee. Compared to the incentive schemes-promo-
tions and relatively modest bonuses and salary increases-that
government agencies now use to motivate inspectors and auditors to
find and report contractor misconduct, qui tam bounties may provide
more potent inducements to hunt for and challenge procurement law
violations.
3. Augment limited public enforcement resources
Sponsors of the qui tam reforms expected decentralized monitor-
ing to improve procurement efficiency by increasing total resources
devoted to detecting and attacking contractor corruption.12 ' To
some extent, this justification is consistent with the efficiency rationale
presented above: Given the choice between spending a fixed amount
of resources on monitoring by contractor employees or monitoring by
public employees, one should prefer employee monitoring because
such individuals can identify fraud at a lower cost than public
employees. For similar reasons, Gary Becker and George Stigler have
found that private enforcement of public law would be more efficient
than public monitoring."
120. See MOOKHERJE- & PNG, supra note 6, at 1-3.
121. See S. REP. No. 345, supra note 11, at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272-73:
In addition to detection, investigative and litigative problems which permit fraud
to go unaddressed, perhaps the most serious problem plaguing effective
enforcement is a lack of resources on the part of Federal enforcement agencies.
. The Committee believes that the [1986 False Claims Act] amendments...
which allow and encourage assistance from the private citizenry can make a
significant impact on bolstering the Government's fraud enforcement effort.
122. Becker & Stigler, supra note 1, at 15.
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Support for qui tam decentralization also rested upon the desire
to obtain more monitoring without having to appropriate federal
funds to pay additional government auditors, inspectors, and
prosecutors.'3 Operation of the private monitoring mechanism
consumes real resources, but it was believed that such resources would
not be drawn from appropriated public funds. The notion that
augmenting decentralized monitoring would provide additional
enforcement at little or no cost to the government is misguided. Qui
tam monitoring entails the consumption of substantial private
resources, and, as discussed below, such transaction costs ultimately
are paid in significant part with public funds.
B. Disadvantages of Qui Tam Actions
Scholars have observed that, notwithstanding positive attributes,
decentralized law enforcement schemes can have perverse efficiency
consequences of their own. Decentralized enforcement systems can
generate excessive litigation, 4 elicit substantial numbers of nuisance
suits,"z and provide tools by which firms strategically use the courts
to impede efficient behavior by rivals." 6  While the interests of
public enforcement officials may not be perfectly congruent with
taxpayer interests, it is likely that the aims of qui tam relators and
taxpayers also are not invariably coincidentY
The formative treatments of decentralized monitoring have
recognized that private enforcement could entail significant agency
costs of its own.l" The 1986 qui tam reforms create species of
agency costs that have largely escaped treatment in scholarly debate
over public and private enforcement. These distinctive costs arise
123. 132 CONG. REC. H9382-03 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986).
124. See Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
371, 374 (1986); Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 3-16; Steven Shavell, The Social Versus
the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 339
(1982).
125. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 437, 448 (1988).
126. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert
Competition, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 247, 248 (1985).
127. This observation provides the implicit policy basis for a series of contractor efforts
to persuade courts to invalidate the 1986 qui tam reforms as, in effect, a constitutionally
defective delegation by Congress of Executive Branch enforcement functions to private
individuals. These arguments have been rejected in each instance. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
128. See Becker & Stigler, supra note 1, at 15-16; Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 28-
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because the 1986 reforms permit whistleblowing employees of
government contractors to attack the conduct of their own employers
and allow government employees to bring suits in their own right to
challenge behavior that their agencies also have authority to prose-
cute. Thus, the private enforcer is not, as Becker and Stigler seem to
assume, external to the entity whose behavior is being regulated," 9
but is an employee of that organization. Making the private enforcer
both an agent of the public and an agent of the party to be monitored
creates distinctive problems. The policymaking process that led to
enactment of the 1986 procurement reforms took scant account of
potential qui tam costs, but their evaluation is essential to any sensible
decision about the future application of qui tam monitoring and
enforcement tools.
1. Interference with legitimate contractor management choices
Business managers routinely make decisions that displease
individual employees. On countless occasions every day, managers in
contractor organizations decline to provide desired salary increases,
withhold promotions, punish misbehavior (for example, tardiness,
unexcused absences, substance abuse), order firings, and make
product design, development, and marketing choices that contradict
the preferences of some subordinates. Each event is a potential
source of employer-employee friction. If the organization in question
receives federal funds-for example, a weapons manufacturer, a
university research institute, a telephone company, or a hospital that
receives Medicaid reimbursements-it is likely that the organization
on some occasion has wavered in adhering to a procurement
regulation with which the organization nonetheless has certified its
compliance.
These conditions generate a constant pool of aggrieved employ-
ees and provide the basis for individuals with some imagination and
familiarity with the organization's operations to conceive a facially
plausible story about organizational departures from statutory or
regulatory commands. Dissatisfied contractor employees may
threaten to file-or file-qui tam actions to deflect legitimate
discipline, extract unwarranted termination arrangements, or second-
guess valid management decisions concerning matters such as the
design and manufacture of the company's products. Efficiency-
129. See Becker & Stigler, supra note 1, at 13-14.
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enhancing employment and product development decisions may be
avoided or weakened.
Firms may adopt costly safeguards to reduce the likelihood of a
qui tam suit. For example, the contractor may invest more resources
in employment screening techniques which identify employees with
personality and character traits suggesting strong tendencies toward
conformity and loyalty. Not only does this increase the cost of
screening employees, but it also may reshape the contractor's work
force in undesirable ways. It is not unusual for highly creative,
inventive individuals to be assertive and headstrong. The wide
availability of qui tam suits may dictate screening methodologies that
emphasize passivity at the expense of inventiveness and creativity.
A second safeguard may take the form of changes in internal
decision-making processes. Qui tam monitoring may increase the
importance of consensus as a decision-making objective because
achieving consensus reduces the possibility that individual employees
will believe that favored approaches were improperly rejected.130 In
effect, the availability of a qui tam suit gives the employee a means
of vetoing disfavored policy choices. Achieving consensus can be
time-consuming and yield decisions that are suboptimal in their
tendency to incorporate compromise positions which satisfy potential
holdouts but fail to make needed choices or respond adequately to
specific problems. The firm may become more concerned about
soothing the feelings of each participant in the decision-making
process and less attentive to solving difficult problems.
2. Strategic threats by rivals and vertically related firms
Performing public contracts often involves extensive collaboration
between two or more firms. Prime contractors for sophisticated
systems such as air traffic control computers and combat aircraft
usually rely on massive networks of subcontractors to provide inputs
for the end product. In many instances the design and development
of a major system is shared equally through joint ventures or teaming
arrangements involving two or more contractors.3 Thus, prime
130. Cf. United States ex rel. Butler v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 71 F.3d 321, 324 (9th
Cir. 1995) (discussing relator's qui tam complaint based in part on employer's rejection of
the relator's draft plan for testing a weapon system). The author is Of Counsel to the law
firm that represented the defendant in Butler.
131. See William B. Burnett & William E. Kovacic, Reform of United States Weapons
Acquisition Policy: Competition, Teaming Agreements, and Dual-Sourcing, 6 YALE J. ON
REG. 249, 270 (1989).
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contractors obtain numerous inputs from vertically-related suppliers
and sometimes share design and production responsibility with direct
rivals. Prime contractors often provide extensive information about
their operations in soliciting bids from competing input suppliers,
overseeing performance by its subcontractors, screening potential
coventurers, and coordinating design and production activities with a
chosen teammate.
The qui tam mechanism can affect relationships among input
suppliers, prime contractors, and coventurers in two ways. First, input
suppliers may use the qui tam mechanism opportunistically to extract
subcontracts from prime contractors. Firms that had bid unsuccessful-
ly on input contracts might allege that the winning subcontractor
bribed the prime contractor. Because the prime contractor must
certify that it has not paid kickbacks to its suppliers, the subcontractor
could file a qui tam suit alleging that the certificate was false and that
any payments made under the contract were tainted.
Second, firms may attempt to use information collected during
the course of performance to extract contractual concessions from
input suppliers, prime contractors, or coventurers 2 For example,
information sharing could reveal to a prime contractor that one of its
subcontractors violated a procurement regulation. The prime
contractor then could threaten a qui tam suit to induce its supplier to
renegotiate the subcontract on terms more favorable to the prime
contractor. The awareness that subcontractors, prime contractors, and
coventurers might use information gathered in the course of collabo-
ration to threaten qui tam suits could impede efficient information
sharing that is important to the success of many contractual relation-
ships.
132. The background of United States ex rel Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d
1339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994) illustrates how input suppliers or
customers of a contractor can use allegations of fraud to extract concessions from the
contractor. In Siller the qui tam relator was the brother and employee of a former
distributor of Becton Dickinson health care products. Id. at 1341. After Becton Dickinson
terminated its relationship with the distributor, the distributor filed a wrongful termination
suit in Texas state court, alleging that Becton Dickinson terminated the distributorship
because the distributor was aware that the defendant was overcharging the government
in sales that it made directly to federal purchasers. Id. at 1340-41. After the state court
action was settled, the distributor's brother filed a qui tam action against Becton Dickinson
and alleged misconduct similar to that pleaded in the state lawsuit. Id.
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3. Delayed identification and correction of problems
Taxpayers prefer early correction of certain types of contractor
conduct. The value of a swift cure is perhaps most evident in the area
of quality control, where failure to abide by specified testing regimes
and materials standards could cause the catastrophic destruction of a
critical component, such as an aircraft engine. Potential qui tam
relators may not share this concern. Rather than promptly bringing
problems to management's attention, employees may allow them to
persist-thus increasing the size of the injury and the relator's
potential recovery-and to gather evidence for pursuing a qui tam
suit. The incentive to delay will be greatest where few people know
of the misconduct, and thus the number of potential competing
relators is small.
For example, an employee not directly involved in a project may
notice irregularities in billing, fulfillment of product testing require-
ments, or other potential misconduct connected with that project.
Unless firm management has authorized the illicit scheme, the
company probably would prefer that the employee immediately bring
such improprieties to management's attention because early internal
detection and correction can significantly reduce the firm's exposure
to legal sanctions. The availability of the qui tam mechanism may
induce the employee to disregard the company's internal anti-fraud
hotlines or similar safeguards.
One of the most interesting episodes of qui tam enforcement
involved a suit filed by a former General Electric employee against
General Electric for paying bribes to an Israeli general in connection
with the sale of jet engines to the Israeli government. 3  The qui
tam relator, Chester Walsh, may have learned of the bribes as early
as 1984, consulted an attorney in 1987, and filed a qui tam suit against
General Electric in November 1990." From 1987 until Walsh filed
suit, the alleged injury to the United States grew by roughly $28.5
million, substantially increasing the base upon which Walsh's bounty
might be calculated.3  Walsh argued that the delay in filing his suit
resulted from his fear that the recipient of the bribe was prepared to
133. United States ex reL Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032
(6th Cir. 1994).
134. IL at 1037.
135. Id at 1038-39.
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have Walsh killed.136 Walsh has stated that he waited until the
general was imprisoned before beginning the action.137 Walsh
conceivably had a genuine concern for his safety, but his behavior also
is consistent with the hypothesis that the damage meter would run
substantially higher if he delayed filing suit.'38
Comparable incentive problems exist for potential relators who
are government employees. Government auditors, inspectors, and
investigators also may fail to exert timely effort to correct problems
identified during the course of their official duties. In auditing a
contractor's accounts, a government investigator might notice a
questionable cost-allocation practice. The best outcome for society is
that improper practices be corrected promptly. If the government
employee anticipates filing a qui tam suit, the employee might decline
to impede the questionable conduct in the expectation that continua-
tion of the behavior will increase the size of the potential qui tam
recovery. Thus, tying the private enforcer's bounty to the size of the
total injury can induce monitoring behavior, such as delayed reporting
of apparent violations, that increases rather than mitigates the injury.
4. Erosion of internal compliance mechanisms
Government contractors routinely create internal mechanisms for
detecting and correcting possible instances of misconduct. For
example, many firms use corporate counsel or internal audit depart-
ments to examine operating units periodically to determine compli-
ance with government regulatory controls. Establishing an internal
compliance apparatus can facilitate early detection and correction of
misconduct. It also can reduce the punishment a contractor would
receive under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'39 and can assist
the firm in making voluntary disclosures to the government which
minimize the firm's exposure for fraud."4
136. Id. at 1037.
137. Id-
138. The district court eventually awarded Walsh a bounty of approximately $11.3
million. IL at 1036.
139. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 8A1.2, 8C2.5(f) (1995).
140. In 1986 the Department of Defense created a Voluntary Disclosure Program to
encourage suppliers to identify contracting improprieties of which the government was not
aware. See June Gibbs Brown, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VOLUNTARY DIsCLO-
SURE PROGRAM: A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. CONT. LAW,
Tab A (compiling letters from the Deputy Secretary of Defense establishing the Voluntary
Disclosure Program).
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Qui tam enforcement can undermine internal compliance
mechanisms in two ways. The first of these, suggested above, is that
employees may choose to file qui tam suits instead of resorting to
internal anti-fraud mechanisms such as hotlines. The second is that
the firm's internal compliance officials may fail to correct instances of
misconduct in a timely manner. Suppose that an internal auditor
observes that one of the contractor's operating divisions appears to be
misallocating labor costs. It is in the interest of taxpayers
and-usually-the firm, for the auditor to move promptly to
investigate and stop the cost mischarging. The qui tam incentive
structure may induce the auditor to ignore the suspect behavior in
order to lay the foundation for a larger qui tam recovery. Unless the
firm can write enforceable contracts with its internal compliance
officials compelling such officials to correct fraud promptly, the qui
tam mechanism may severely reduce the effectiveness of internal
compliance systems.
5. Challenges to beneficial or benign conduct
The efficiency effects of the qui tam mechanism depend greatly
upon how often relators challenge conduct that is genuinely harmful.
The net benefits of qui tam monitoring shrink as the number of "false
positives"-challenges to benign or beneficial conduct-increase.
There are at least two basic reasons to think that relators in a
significant number of instances will attack conduct that is benign. The
first is the possibility that relators will mistakenly conclude that a
contractor's acts are fraudulent when such acts in fact conform to
legal requirements or are undertaken without the state of mind
needed to establish fraud. Faulty diagnoses of observed behavior are
inescapable given the complexity and murkiness of the regulatory
commands controlling government contractors. James Nagle accu-
rately observes that the federal procurement regulations are "a mine-
studded labyrinth bewildering and dangerous to Government and
contractors alike."'' Relators may be particularly prone to
misapprehend the legal significance of contractor efforts to comply
141. JAMES F. NAGLE, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS: POLICY, PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURES 532 (1987); see also 1 COMMISSION ON GOV'T PROCUREMENT, REPORT
OF THE COMM'N ON GOV'T PROCUREMENT 31 (1972) (noting the existence of "a
burdensome mass and maze of procurement and procurement-related regulations");
PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON DEF. MGMT., A FORMULA FOR ACTION: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION 18 (1986) (observing that "the
legal regime for defense acquisition is today impossibly cumbersome").
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with the government's complex cost allocation and accounting
conventions. 42 Secondly, relators may incorrectly characterize as
fraudulent deviations from regulatory requirements that result from
innocent error or from other impulses that lack the degree of
deliberateness or recklessness needed to establish fraud.14 3
A third source of challenges to benign conduct consists of
deliberate, strategic efforts to extract settlement offers from defen-
dants. The defense of qui tam actions is costly in terms of expendi-
tures for outside counsel and diversion of the contractor's internal
resources to investigate and respond to the qui tam allegations. Qui
tam suits also attract adverse publicity. While such matters remain on
the court's active docket, the defendant is likely to confront a series
of news reports that give full play to the relator's allegations,
regardless of the underlying merits of the claims. Relators may file
qui tam actions to extract settlements which exploit the defendant's
desire to avoid the costs of legal defense and adverse publicity.'
142. Paul Biddle's attack upon Stanford University's practice of charging certain
indirect costs on federal research contracts appears to constitute an important example of
a relator false positive-characterizing as fraudulent conduct which satisfies regulatory
requirements. In 1990, Biddle, an auditor who was the representative of the Office of
Naval Research at Stanford, alleged that the university had engaged in fraud by using
incorrect rates for billing indirect costs to the government and by charging various species
of unallowable costs to its federal contracts. See Kenneth J. Cooper, Navy to Honor
Biddle's Campus Crusade, WASH. PoST, Sept. 30, 1991, at A9. Stanford responded that
the disputed accounting practices conformed to the terms of numerous memoranda of
understanding executed by Stanford and the Navy extending back to the early 1980s.
Biddle's allegations inspired the Navy to commence an administrative proceeding to
recover millions of dollars in disputed costs. Biddle also filed a qui tam suit alleging injury
to the government of over $300 million. Id. In October 1994, the Navy settled its suit
against Stanford on terms that largely exonerated the university and cast doubt on the
legal soundness of Biddle's allegations. Stanford agreed to pay the government $1.2
million as an adjustment for costs charged in fiscal years 1981-92, but the Navy concluded
that it did "'not have a claim that Stanford engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or other
wrongdoing with respect to the Memoranda of Understanding.'" Navy, Stanford Settle
Indirect Cost Dispute, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at 201 (Oct. 20, 1994). Biddle's
qui tam suit, which did not elicit Justice Department participation, is still pending.
143. See Perzan, supra note 20, at 642-47 (analyzing application of the False Claims Act
to allegations of fraud in scientific research, and discussing the importance of distinguishing
between an outright fabrication or manipulation of data and alterations which result from
mere sloppiness or "self-deception" by the researcher).
144. A number of reported settlements in qui tam suits since 1986 seem consistent with
this explanation. For example, in United States em reL Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc.,
714 F. Supp. 1084 (C.D. Cal. 1989), the relator alleged that the defendants filed false
claims totalling $214 million. See Thompson, supra note 26, at 35. Because the
government declined to intervene, the relator would have recovered up to 30% of this
amount, $64.2 million, if he had sustained his claims. The case was settled for $500,000,
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Settlements of qui tam suits can be structured to exclude payment
to the government. Even when it declines to prosecute a case, the
government is entitled to at least seventy percent of the ultimate
recovery, including sums obtained by settlement. However, relators
can exclude the government from the recovery either by denominat-
ing the settlement amount as attorneys' fees and related legal costs or
by making the qui tam allegations one part of a larger complaint that
includes state law claims of wrongful termination or breach of
contract. The settlement can then be cast in terms of payment for
abandoning the state law based claims-causes of action in which the
government has no basis to assert an interest in the outcome.4 '
6. Distortions in intrafirm cooperation and information flows
One way for contractors to reduce the likelihood of qui tam suits
by their employees is to restrict access to information that might be
construed as supporting an allegation of fraud. Suppose a concern
arises about whether a component has passed contractually mandated
quality tests. Several hypotheses (for example, improper application
of the test, misreading of the test results, a design flaw, or a produc-
tion defect) could explain the apparent inability of the product to
meet the test's requirements. The most effective approach to solving
the problem may be to enlist the help of a broad spectrum of
company employees-design engineers, quality control officials, and
production workers. Among other steps, one would alert these
employees to all possible explanations for the test failure and enlist
their assistance in identifying causes of, and cures for, the problem.
The prospect of qui tam monitoring may caution against
embracing this approach. Encouraging employees to speculate freely
about and discuss explanatory hypotheses may be seen as disseminat-
ing information that could provide the basis for a qui tam claim. A
firm might decide instead to restrict the range of subjects that are
analyzed openly within the company and to reduce the number and
type of individuals who are engaged to address specific matters. Qui
most of which was earmarked as reimbursement for the relator's attorneys fees and costs.
See Richard A. Sauber, Relators vs. The Department of Justice: Intramural Conflict in the
Qui Tam Case, in GRAPES OF WRATH: A GOOD OR BAD YEAR FOR EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS?, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. CONT. LAW, Tab F, at 1, 27-28. The defendant paid the
government $28,000 in costs for investigating the relator's claims, but the government
received nothing else from the settlement. Id at 28 & n.18. The author is Of Counsel to
the law firm that represented one of the Stillwell defendants.
145. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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tam monitoring by employees may discourage desirable cooperation
and may lead to inefficient compartmentalization of information
within the contractor's organization. This relates to a larger concern
that historically has accompanied consideration of decentralized
whistleblower monitoring schemes: namely, that deputizing each
employee to attack misconduct by colleagues can inhibit the coopera-
tion needed to make the organization function effectively.
Expansive application of qui tam monitoring also may damage
firm efficiency in another important respect. The legislative record
leading to adoption of the 1986 False Claims Act amendments
expresses the desire of Congress to unravel "the conspiracy of silence"
sustained by participants in fraudulent schemes within contractor
organizations."4 The benefits of using an informing mechanism to
break a conspiracy of silence within an organization must be weighed
against potentially harmful effects upon desirable features of
organizational conduct. Cooperation, teamwork, and close collabora-
tion among individual workers often are characteristics of successful
organizations. An inherent cost of any informing mechanism is to
reduce the willingness of potential team members to share ideas and
confidences and engage in uninhibited discussion about how the
organization is performing and how it might improve. The awareness
that one's speculation about the existence or causes of a potential
problem might be construed as an admission of misconduct inexorably
will tend to impede the exchange of ideas and reduce the extent and
effectiveness of employee cooperation within the organization.
Expansive reliance on informing and bounty hunting as monitoring
tools necessarily must come at some cost in team effectiveness.
7. Distortions in contractor-purchasing agency relations
As indicated above, 47 several courts have ruled that the 1986
qui tam reforms give government employees liberal standing to bring
qui tam actions, even when the qui tam suit is based upon information
accumulated in the course of the employee's official duties. Particu-
larly striking is the decision in United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC
Corp., 4 in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit stated that government employees need not wait until the
government concludes its own nonpublic investigation before filing a
146. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 11, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5270-71.
147. See supra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
148. 931 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
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qui tam suit.' The logic of Williams suggests that, in the absence
of a pending public inquiry, any government employee can maintain
a qui tam suit so long as the employee beats the Justice Department
to the courthouse.
Expansive interpretations of government employee standing have
powerful implications for the relationship between federal agencies
and their suppliers. Any government employee who routinely
transacts business with the contractor-program managers, auditors,
inspectors, investigators, contract administration personnel, attor-
neys-is a potential qui tam relator. Not only can these officials sue
individually, but it is possible to imagine collaboration between a
contractor employee and a government official, such as an auditor, to
develop a qui tam complaint that both might file against the contrac-
tor. Researchers have found that success in public contracting often
depends upon unwritten, relational features of the transaction
between the government and its suppliers."' 0 Placing the decision
to prosecute in the hands of individual government employees may
endanger valuable relational features of federal procurement
transactions.
Consider two ways in which qui tam monitoring can undermine
desirable relational aspects of transactions between the government
and its suppliers. One result may be a greater incidence of what
amounts to extortion by public officials. Giving each government
official a large bounty for detecting fraud may increase the number
of instances in which such officials challenge conduct that is largely or
entirely benign. Dilip Mookherjee and I.P.L. Png suggest that
generous bounties might stiffen the resistance of public inspectors to
bribery by regulated firms.' It is conceivable, however, that the
bounty mechanism also might provide a greater incentive for public
149. Id. at 1503 & n.16.
150. See STEVEN KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE FEAR
OF DISCRETION AND THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 62-85 (1990);
Robert Austin & Patrick Larkey, The Unintended Consequences of Micromanagement.
The Case of Procuring Mission Critical Computer Resources, 25 POL'Y SCI. 3, 8-9 (1992);
Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An
Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement, 24 RAND J. ECON. 126, 128-29
(1993).
151. See MOOKHERJEE & PNG, supra note 6, at 2-3.
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inspectors to threaten attacks upon relatively minor violations152 or
benign conduct as a way to extract side payments from the contractor.
A significant number of government agencies are responsible for
overseeing contractor performance and investigating apparent
departures from regulatory requirements.5 3 A second consequence
of liberal standing for government employees is likely to be a
reduction in the contractor's willingness to cooperate with government
agencies in executing routine contract administration, oversight, and
auditing activities. Contractors will regard each government request
or demand for information as a potential conduit for data that
government employees might use to develop qui tam claims.
Contractors may think twice before engaging government officials in
candid, uninhibited discussions of problems that the contractor has
encountered during performance. Participation in programs designed
to encourage voluntary disclosure to government agencies of
misconduct identified through internal contractor auditing becomes
problematic if individual government employees can incorporate
damaging information directly into their own qui tam complaints.
1 1
4
One justification for decentralized qui tam monitoring is that it
curbs the tendency of purchasing agencies and contractors to
collaborate in evading procurement regulatory commands. Purchasing
agencies are seen as victims of supplier capture, so that purchasing
officials voluntarily bend the rules for suppliers and refrain from
attacking misconduct. Law enforcement agencies that are cautious or
hesitate to investigate or prosecute apparent contractor departures
from regulatory norms are taken as proof of the government's general
unwillingness to disturb cozy relationships with entrenched suppli-
ers.55 Thus, permissive qui tam standing is said to serve a valuable
purpose by encouraging individual employees of contractors and
government agencies to defect from the corrupt, unwritten agreements
to which their employers adhere.
152. By minor violations I have in mind comparatively trivial departures from stated
regulatory requirements. Because the False Claims Act assesses fixed penalties for each
false claim, mere technical violations can generate substantial penalties where the
contractor routinely submits vouchers for payment under a contract that is "tainted" by
a technical impropriety.
153. See JOHN W. WHELAN, UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
130-38 (1993).
154. See Qui Tam Litigation, supra note 22, at 129.
155. See Bullock, supra note 72, at 386; DeSouza, supra note 119, at 399-401.
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This perspective ignores the possibility that purchasing agencies
and contractors sometimes collectively ignore or bend procurement
rules because full compliance with such commands would significantly
inhibit the efficient production of needed goods and services.
1 16
Many procurement rules substantially raise the cost of executing
public contracts while offering few, if any, offsetting benefits."5 7 To
get things done, purchasing agencies and contractors sometimes
operate by understandings which, in effect, contract around efficiency-
reducing procurement rules.' The hesitation of government
purchasing agencies and the Justice Department to challenge
departures from nominal procurement standards may not invariably
reflect unseemly capture by or capitulation to private suppliers.
Rather, such hesitation may flow from awareness that government
officials endorsed departures from existing rules because doing so
would reduce prices, improve quality, or speed delivery.
Granting government employees liberal standing ignores the
possibility that purchasing agencies and the DOJ sometimes do not
prosecute to avoid forcing compliance with welfare-reducing require-
ments. By increasing the likelihood that departures from all
procurement rules-wise or foolish-will be challenged, qui tam
monitoring may increase enforcement of standards whose application
reduces the efficiency of purchasing agencies and suppliers alike. Not
only will some efficient practices be curtailed, but contractors will
expend additional sums to ensure that all features of their dealings
with government buyers are conducted strictly by the book.
156. William Landes and Richard Posner point out that many statutes and regulations
prohibit some conduct that is socially desirable. Public law enforcement officials
sometimes reduce the costs of such overinclusiveness in prohibitory statutes by declining
to attack beneficial conduct that nominally violates the law. Landes & Posner, supra note
1, at 38-41; cf. Greenstein, supra note 3, at 36-37 (suggesting the importance of permitting
exceptions to rigid procedural procurement rules).
157. See JACQUES S. GANSLER, AFFORDING DEFENSE 108-09 (1989); THOMAS L.
MCNAUGHER, NEw WEAPONS, OLD POLITICS: AMERICA'S MILITARY PROCUREMENT
MUDDLE 127-28, 151, 160 (1989); Kovacic, Regulatory Controls, supra note 50, at 30;
Kovacic, Sorcerer's Apprentice, supra note 7, at 120-21; Mary K. Marvel & Howard P.
Marvel, Contracting Problems and Public Sector Organization 2-3 (Sept. 1990) (paper
prepared for presentation at the Association of Public Policy and Management meetings
in San Francisco, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
158. See William E. Kovacic, The Role of Relational Agreements in Reducing the
Adverse Effects of Inefficient Procurement Regulations 9 (Nov. 18, 1995) (manuscript
prepared for the 65th Annual Conference of the Southern Economic Association, on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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Qui tam enforcement can undermine one other potentially
valuable relational feature of agreements between the government
and its suppliers. In the course of performance, a government agency
and its suppliers develop understandings about the interpretation of
contract specifications. The purchasing agency and the contractor
might agree that a given level of performance satisfies the seller's
contractual obligations, even though the contract specification might
be read to require attainment of a higher level of performance.
Througlf a series of relational understandings, the government and the
contractor may agree to relax certain specifications whose attainment
may no longer be essential to satisfying the government's needs, or
which can be achieved only through an expenditure of effort whose
returns do not, in the government's view, justify such additional effort.
Qui tam enforcement might prevent useful relational adjustments in
contract terms if a relator subsequently could persuade a court that
an apparent deviation from a strict reading of the contract's require-
ments constituted fraud.
159
8. Distortions in public enforcement activities
Giving government employees liberal standing to pursue qui tam
actions introduces several potential distortions into the manner in
which federal agencies monitor and enforce compliance with
procurement regulations. One consequence, mentioned above, may
be more instances in which public officials threaten to attack
fundamentally benign conduct-or violations of technical require-
ments carrying substantial monetary penalties-to extort bribes from
the contractor. Such threats are more credible if the government
employee can sue unilaterally rather than be forced to gain the
approval of superiors to whom the contractor can appeal to discour-
age the prosecution of legitimate conduct or behavior that amounts
to an insignificant violation.
A second distortion stems from the possible tendency of bounties
to induce public employees to devote disproportionate effort to
159. Several False Claims Act cases have involved challenges to contractor behavior
that appeared to have gained the approval of the government body to which the contractor
was supplying goods or services. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Butler v. Hughes
Helicopters, Inc., 71 F.3d 321, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting relator challenge to
adjustments in weapon system testing regime where government officials knew of
adjustments and cooperated in making them); Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1421
(9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting relator challenge to weapon system producer, which communicat-
ed alleged design deficiencies to the government purchaser).
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monitoring firms with comparatively large assets and major contracts.
To the potential government qui tam relator, deep pockets ensure that
the firm can pay a substantial judgment or settlement, and contracts
with large dollar values provide a more fertile ground for large
recoveries if colorable allegations of fraud can be made. This may
yield an underinvestment in effort devoted to monitoring smaller
firms with weak balance sheets and contracts with lesser dollar
values.1" Marginally solvent subcontractors that make simple, low-
value components such as aircraft fasteners may receive too little
attention, even though the result of their misconduct-for example,
the disintegration of a fuselage due to defective fasteners-can be at
least as serious as fraud by a large prime contractor.
A third difficulty is that permissive government employee
standing potentially engages law enforcement agencies in a race with
their employees to file suit. This may cause government agencies to
bring lawsuits prematurely to avoid the need to share possible
recoveries with an employee/relator. Accelerating the decision to
prosecute may result in the filing of cases against conduct that,
evaluated in more detail and with greater deliberation, would be
found to be innocuous.
9. Impact on exit and entry
Operating under the public procurement system's qui tam
monitoring regime, firms confront distinctive costs that they do not
160. In testimony before a House Judiciary Subcommittee in 1992, Stuart M. Gerson,
Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ Civil Division, recited the following roster of
problems posed by giving qui tam standing to government employees:
[I]nherent conflicts of interest among federal employees that the potential of
large qui tam awards would create; the incentive for government employees
assigned to investigations to understate the significance of the cases ... in the
hope that the government will not follow up, leaving the way open for a qui tam
case; morale problems in government service among employees assigned to non-
fraud investigations or smaller dollar value investigations; and the misallocation
of government resources through individual decisions by government employees
to spend official time on cases they hope could lead to potential personal
recoveries rather than on other assigned duties.
False Claims Act Technical Amendments of 1992: Hearing on H.R. 4563 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1992) (statement of Stuart M. Gerson). To some extent
such distortions already exist because government auditing and law enforcement offices
reward employees for their success in uncovering contractor fraud. Trueger observes that
institutional rewards tend to flow more heavily toward auditors who find that contractors
have engaged in misconduct than to auditors who give contractors a clean bill of health.
See TRUEGER, supra note 28, at 1128.
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incur in commercial markets. 1 ' These costs include greater expo-
sure to qui tam suits by the firm's employees and additional precau-
tions taken to minimize the likelihood of qui tam suits. For firms that
previously have not done business with federal agencies, the existence
of such costs can discourage entry into government procurement
markets. For firms that serve both commercial and government
customers, the costs associated with qui tam monitoring may dictate
a gradual de-emphasis on federal procurement in the firm's business
mix or exit from federal contracting altogether. By inhibiting new
entry and encouraging the exit of existing suppliers, qui tam monitor-
ing may reduce the pool of contractors and the degree of rivalry and
competition among such firms, creating the potential for a costlier,
lower-quality product.
10. Impact on public expenditures
Experience with the augmented qui tam mechanism contradicts
the view of some legislators who believed that administration of the
1986 reforms would produce greater enforcement without an
additional commitment of federal resources. Qui tam suits impose
three types of costs upon the U.S. Treasury. The first is a substantial
increase in DOJ resources devoted to exercising the government's
evaluation function under the 1986 reforms. In the six months
preceding enactment of the 1986 amendments, Justice Department
Civil Division attorneys spent approximately 1100 hours on qui tam
matters. In the first six months of 1990, Civil Division attorneys
devoted roughly 11,000 hours to qui tam matters.
162
The second charge to public funds results from the ability of
government contractors to bill all or part of defense-related legal fees
to the government when the contractor defeats the allegations of the
qui tam suit."6 The provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regula-
161. See Kovacic, Regulatory Controls, supra note 50, at 30, 37; Todd B. Castleton,
Comment, Compounding Fraud: The Cost of Acquiring Relator Information Under the
False Claims Act and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 GEO.
MASON U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996) (page proofs at 327, 354, on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review).
162. See Cavanagh, supra note 52, at 18-19; see also Budget Expands, Anticipating
Immigration Cases, DOJ ALERT, Apr. 3, 1995, at 11, 11 (reporting that qui tam litigation
accounted for 22% of the caseload of the Civil Division's Commercial Litigation branch
in 1994, compared to 4% in 1989).
163. See Eric H. Zahler, Allowability of Legal Expenses in a Defense of Fraud
Proceeding, in THE NEW WAVE OF QUI TAM, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. PUB, CONT. LAW 1, 11-15.
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tions (FAR) governing reimbursement for professional fees in effect
permit the contractor to charge the government for costs of defending
procurement fraud suits that ultimately prove to be baseless.164 In
addition, the contractor often can pass along all or part of the costs
associated with adopting certain administrative techniques-such as
more exacting methods of screening potential employees-whose aim
is to reduce the likelihood of a qui tam challenge.
A third cost would arise if government employees file qui tam
suits to attack conduct that the DOJ would have challenged even in
the absence of a qui tam mechanism. The clearest illustration would
occur if a government employee initiates a qui tam suit during the
pendency of a nonpublic DOJ fraud investigation. By filing a qui tam
suit, the government employee qualifies for at least part of a recovery
that otherwise would go entirely to the federal treasury. In such
instances, the qui tam mechanism merely facilitates transfers between
the government and its employees.
V. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION AND POSSIBLE REFINEMENTS
Publicly available data about the effects of the 1986 qui tam
reforms provide only a limited basis for determining whether the
anticipated efficiency benefits of qui tam monitoring (inducing greater
revelation of contractor-private information concerning fraud and
ensuring that enforcement defaults by federal agencies do not permit
harmful conduct to go unchallenged) or the possible efficiency costs
(resources consumed in responding to relator opportunism or mistake)
predominate. Although one can obtain aggregate data on total
164. FAR 31.205-47 disallows the recovery of legal and administrative costs associated
with defending against fraud allegations in a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding
where the outcome is a conviction in a criminal proceeding, a finding of fraud in a civil or
administrative proceeding, or the disposition of the matter by consent or compromise if
the proceeding could have led to any of the outcomes described above. 48 C.F.R.
§ 31.205-47 (1996). At a minimum, this FAR provision permits a contractor who gains
dismissal of qui tam fraud claims to treat its defense costs as allowable costs. Id
However, the contractor's ability to recover these costs may depend on whether the
contract that is the subject of the fraud claims has been finally priced or closed out. See
In re General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA Nos. 39500, 40995, 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 24,657,
at 123,005-06 (Dec. 16, 1991) (refusing to retroactively adjust firm-fixed price contracts to
permit the contractor to claim as allowable costs $29 million in legal fees that the
contractor had incurred to defend civil and criminal fraud charges which the government
dismissed voluntarily). In General Dynamics the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals observed that contractors could protect themselves against this contingency by
negotiating advanced agreements that would allow for a price adjustment should fraud
proceedings be dismissed after a contract is finally priced or closed out. I& at 123,006.
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numbers of suits and dispositions, detailed accounts of complaints and
settlements are relatively rare.1" Thus, it is difficult to develop
even a rough sense of how many qui tam actions are based on
meritorious claims. Empirical data about the effects of the 1986
reforms upon internal contractor organization and behavior come
almost entirely in the form of random, idiosyncratic anecdotes.
Despite the lack of rich empirical data concerning qui tam effects,
one can construct a framework to analyze the operation of the qui
tam mechanism as more data become available. Indeed, even a
purely abstract assessment of the 1986 reforms suggests areas for
change. In general, the net value to society of qui tam monitor-
ing-and the desirability of modifications to the 1986 reforms-
essentially depend upon four considerations. First, are there adequate
controls to deal with plausible scenarios of relator error and oppor-
tunism? Second, are there less costly alternative methods for
monitoring contractor behavior and for discouraging shirking by
public enforcement agencies? Third, are the underlying substantive
conduct standards that qui tam monitoring seeks to enforce appropri-
ate? Fourth, are penalties for violations calibrated to correspond to
the seriousness of the underlying offense as measured by its economic
harm?
A. Adequacy of Constraints upon Relator Error and Opportunism
The discussion of qui tam disadvantages above has identified a
number of ways in which qui tam relators-contractor employees,
government employees, or private firms-can use the 1986 reforms
strategically or opportunistically, or can misidentify benign behavior
as being corrupt. In the legislative debates leading to the adoption of
the original False Claims Act'6 in 1863, Michigan senator Jacob
Howard acknowledged the possibility that relators might behave
opportunistically but observed that qui tam enforcement contemplated
enlisting a "rogue to catch a rogue."167 Advocates of expansive qui
tam enforcement invoke Howard's statement as a basis for rejecting
any measures, other than those already contained in the False Claims
Act," for deterring destructive behavior by the "rogue. ' 169 Yet
165. A significant number of pending qui tam matters remain under seal.
166. Ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863).
167. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955-56 (1863).
168. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text (discussing False Claims Act
restrictions on bounties for relators who orchestrate fraud).
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the net effect of enhanced decentralized monitoring depends upon the
availability of controls to discourage the filing of erroneous, frivolous,
abusive, or rent-seeking actions. It is doubtful that Senator Howard
would endorse a mechanism that ultimately forced the government to
bear costs which would exceed the benefits of enhanced monitoring.
It also is questionable that Congress intended to foreclose exploration
of any adjustments in the existing qui tam mechanism that served to
curb harmful relator behavior while preserving the core advantages
of decentralized monitoring. The discussion below proposes ap-
proaches for providing the needed constraints upon qui tam suits that
contradict taxpayer interests.
1. Allowing counterclaims to discourage relator opportunism
In a number of instances, defendants have pursued counterclaims
against qui tam plaintiffs for alleged participation in fraudulent
conduct or for breaches of contractual or other duties in order to avail
themselves of internal corporate mechanisms to correct fraud. For
the most part, courts have taken a hostile view toward such counter-
claims."0 Opinions rejecting counterclaims reflect the view that
allowing counterclaims would contradict the False Claims Act's
objective of giving potential relators the greatest possible incentive to
challenge contractor misconduct." Such decisions also emphasize
the apparent willingness of the statute's sponsors to tolerate corrupt
behavior by relators if their prosecution of a qui tam suit serves to
169. See HELMER ET AL., supra note 22, at 251-52.
170. See, e.g., Mortgages, Inc. v. United States District Court, 934 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.
1991) (dismissing counterclaims for indemnity and contribution against relator who
allegedly participated in the fraudulent scheme set forth in qui tam suit); cf. Burch ex reL
United States v. Piqua Eng'g, 145 F.R.D. 452,457-58 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (allowing qui tam
defendant to pursue independent counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of duty of
loyalty, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of duty of fair representation); see also Kent
D. Strader, Comment, Counterclaims Against Whistleblowers: Should Counterclaims
Against Qui Tam Plaintiffs Be Allowed in False Claims Act Cases?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 713,
735-46 (1993) (discussing judicial treatment of counterclaims issue).
171. See, e.g., Mortgages, Inc., 934 F.2d at 213 ("The FCA is in no way intended to
ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers by providing defendants with a remedy against a qui
tam plaintiff with 'unclean hands.' "); United States ex reL Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles
& Space Co., 779 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (rejecting qui tam defendant's
counterclaims on ground that "to permit defendant to pursue a counterclaim for breach
of contract and breach of loyalty for the failure to first raise its concerns with the alleged
wrongdoer, would allow wrongdoers to retaliate against whistleblowers, and is contrary to
legislative intent").
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expose fraud." Although most reported opinions have rejected the
filing of counterclaims against qui tam relators, one court has allowed
a defendant to pursue a counterclaim for "independent damages.""
Judicial opposition to counterclaims is misplaced, for it ignores
how the existing scheme of qui tam monitoring creates strong
incentives for perverse behavior on the part of the contractor's
employees. Because the amount of the relator's bounty is a function
of the total damage to the government, contractor employees may
passively observe or encourage questionable conduct rather than
seeking to correct such behavior, either by using the contractor's
internal anti-fraud controls or, where such controls fail, by promptly
filing a qui tam suit. Second, the qui tam mechanism may induce
employees-such as internal auditors-whose duties involve the
detection and correction of misconduct to shirk in fulfilling their
responsibilities to their employers.
Firms should be allowed to use counterclaims to enforce internal
ethics codes that compel employees to perform a gatekeeping
function174 by refusing to participate in misconduct and to report all
apparent deviations from procurement standards to a company
ombudsman. If employees violate these requirements and later file
qui tam suits based upon conduct that should have been resisted and
reported, the employer should be permitted to pursue counterclaims
for the breach of a duty to forego wrongful behavior and to alert
management to such conduct. Perhaps most important, it is difficult
to imagine how contractors can operate internal compliance systems
if they cannot bind internal compliance officials, such as auditors and
corporate counsel, to act in a way that ends misconduct promptly.
There may be little point in operating an internal hotline if the person
on the receiving end is allowed to use special access to information
within the firm to prepare qui tam complaints rather than use internal
procedures to correct fraud swiftly.
Contractors also should be permitted to seek contribution or
indemnification from employees who have fostered or acquiesced in
questionable conduct. Contribution or indemnification suits also
172. See Mortgages, Inc., 934 F.2d at 213; United States ex reL Newsham, 779 F. Supp.
at 1253.
173. See United States ex rel. Madden v. General Dynamics, 4 F.3d 827, 831 (9th Cir.
1993).
174. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986).
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should be available against the firm's external advisors, such as
outside counsel, who use confidential relationships with the firm to
develop and prosecute a qui tam claim. Suppose, for example, that
a contractor's outside counsel detects a pattern of fraud within a
client's organization. The fraud involves a possible total civil penalty
of $100 million under the False Claims Act and has neither been
revealed to the government nor publicly disclosed. One can ask what
would deter the attorney from filing a qui tam suit against the client.
One possibility is the certainty of a proceeding before the state bar's
disciplinary board for, among other grounds, violations of ethical
canons requiring the lawyer to preserve client confidences and secrets
and to represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.75
But the lawyer might deem a qui tam bounty of as much as $30
million to be an acceptable price to pay for the loss of a license to
practice law. Unless the client can pursue a counterclaim or
independent action against the lawyer, there may be no way to deter
the attorney-or other external advisors such as accountants-from
abusing a confidential relationship for personal gain.
2. Adjusting damage awards to encourage timely suits
The False Claims Act's formula for calculating the relator's
bounty requires adjustment to encourage relators to challenge corrupt
behavior in a timely manner. Taxpayers have an interest in the
prompt correction of fraud, and a bounty system that rewards the
relator according to the total size of the fraud may encourage delay
by inspiring relators to wait until the damage to the government has
increased. It is unwise to tie the firefighter's reward to the total size
of the blaze extinguished. The perverse incentive associated with
allowing a problem to grow larger can be corrected by calculating the
relator's bounty as a percentage of damages suffered by the govern-
175. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1981) ("A
Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client."); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981) ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."). In United States ex reL John Doe v. X Corp.,
862 F. Supp. 1502, 1503 (E.D. Va. 1994), the court confronted the issue of whether an
attorney who had served as in-house counsel for a corporation could properly act as a
False Claims Act relator against the same corporation. The court held that the False
Claims Act did not preclude standing by attorneys, including in-house counsel, to serve as
relators. Id. at 1508. The court reasoned that state law protections governing the
professional responsibility of attorneys provided adequate assurances that lawyers would
not abuse confidential relationships with their clients. Id. at 1507-08.
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ment up to the time that the relator knew or should have known of
the misconduct at issue. Damages arising after this point would be
excluded from the base on which the bounty is computed.
3. Discouraging government employee opportunism
There are at least three approaches for discouraging government
employees from opportunistically filing qui tam suits before the
government decides to prosecute apparent instances of fraud. The
first, and most appropriate, path is to establish a complete bar on qui
tam suits by government employees who (a) work in bureaus with
responsibility for investigating or prosecuting procurement
fraud-such as the DOJ or an inspector general's office, (b) work in
an agency that is the target of the fraudulent scheme in question, or
(c) obtain information relevant to procurement fraud in the course of
discharging their official duties. There are several grounds for a total
ban on government employee suits in these circumstances. As
described above,176 granting standing to government employees can
undermine the successful performance and oversight of individual
contracts by eroding healthy relational features of purchaser-supplier
agreements, distorting incentives for proper monitoring of contractor
activities, and depriving the government of payments that ordinarily
would have been paid entirely to the U.S. Treasury.
Giving standing to individual government employees threatens
other, more fundamental harm to the formation and execution of
public procurement policy. In effect, government employee standing
serves to eliminate an agency's prosecutorial discretion. Qui tam
monitoring generally squeezes prosecutorial discretion out of a system
of law, but it does so with greater force where the potential relator is
a government employee. Compared to a private relator, the
government employee has access to information which the govern-
ment is uniquely able to collect and maintain. Access to this
information permits the government employee to override the
agency's decision not to prosecute, or to prosecute in ways that the
individual employee believes to be insufficiently robust. Prosecutorial
discretion can be abused, but it is hardly evident that it always or
routinely is misused.
The loss of prosecutorial discretion is one element of a larger loss
of institutional power to set policy and be held accountable for its
176. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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results. Qui tam monitoring by government employees severely
weakens the agency's ability to credibly commit itself to a specific
course of action, because each government employee ultimately
retains the power to prosecute by filing a qui tam action. The loss of
policymaking flexibility would be most evident where the government
has decided to change its approach to enforcing a comparatively open-
ended law or regulation that lends itself to alternative interpretations.
The government might choose to narrow the focus of its enforcement
efforts, but the government qui tam relator can override this choice
by bringing a suit premised on a broader, preexisting interpretation
of the same legal command. So long as the relator's interpretation
strikes a court as plausible, the government loses its ability to adjust
the enforcement of the law.
In effect, a legal system that grants qui tam standing to govern-
ment employees regards all exercises of discretion by government
procurement officials as inherently suspect. Because one cannot trust
the judgments of government purchasing agencies or the DOJ, the
argument goes, it is necessary to allow individual employees of these
institutions to proceed unilaterally. Yet there is no particular reason
to think that officials engaged in making and executing public
procurement policy are inherently more prone to make corrupt or
flawed decisions than government officials in other agencies. If qui
tam monitoring is necessary to correct corruption or sloth by
government institutions responsible for public procurement, then one
would think it would be suitable in a much broader range of contexts.
Embracing qui tam monitoring for procurement leads one to ask why
an individual government employee should not be allowed to second-
guess the prosecutorial decisions of government agencies in other
contexts. Why do we not allow government employees to override a
decision not to prosecute, or prosecute lightly, in other areas? If we
are concerned with the possibility of disjointed, inconsistent, or
mischievous suits by individual employees in other areas, there is little
reason to ignore such hazards for procurement policy.
Short of a complete ban on suits, a second-best strategy for
dealing with government employee standing is to severely limit the
circumstances in which a government employee could proceed
unilaterally. At a minimum, employees who rely on information
developed during the term of their public employment should be
required to demonstrate that (a) such information was disclosed to
government officials responsible for investigating and prosecuting
fraud, and (b) that enforcement officials either declined to investigate
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or conducted an inquiry and determined it to be fruitless. Under
these restrictions, current or former government employees could
proceed only after full disclosure and after government law enforce-
ment agencies have decided whether to prosecute. In these limited
circumstances, such employees might be permitted to demonstrate
that law enforcement groups deliberately allowed pending investiga-
tions to languish in order to delay or avoid prosecution.
A further limiting strategy involves sanctioning employees who
arguably have breached special duties owed to the government. For
example, government attorneys constitute an important subset of
potential qui tam relators. In dealing with its own attorneys, the
government might argue that the relator violated the duty of loyalty
that attorneys owe to their clients-that is, the government agency.
The disloyal conduct consists of failing to alert the government of
apparent misconduct and by appropriating to oneself part of the
client's property rights. This occurs because the attorney, by filing a
qui tam suit before the government can complete its own investigation
and file a suit in its own right, is entitled to part of a recovery that
otherwise would go entirely to the U.S. Treasury.
In dealing with nonattorneys, government agencies might use
similar arguments based upon the view that public employees
essentially have contracted to give the government a right of first
refusal to attack contractor misconduct. The government might assert
that employees who fail to report apparent episodes of fraud to their
superiors, or refuse to allow the government adequate time to
investigate and prosecute in its own right, violate statutory ethical
requirements that bar employees from converting to their own use
confidential information obtained during their public employment. As
with contractor claims for breach of contract and for contribution or
indemnification, the effectiveness of such countbrstrategies is
important to the long term equilibrium of qui tam practice.
4. Enhanced DOJ screening to eliminate
erroneous or frivolous suits
The 1986 qui tam reforms gave the DOJ an important quality
control function in reviewing relator allegations. Most importantly,
the reforms permit the DOJ to move to dismiss lawsuits that lack
substantive merit. In 688 cases through March 15, 1996, the DOJ has
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declined to prosecute a qui tam suit." In only a single instance has
the DOJ moved to dismiss a qui tam suit for lack of substantive merit
or because the maintenance of the qui tam suit contradicted the
government's interests. 7 It is improbable that, even though these
cases were deemed insufficiently attractive to warrant DOJ prosecu-
tion, all but one of these cases deserved to go forward. One can only
conclude that the screening function in practice is virtually nonexis-
tent.
The most likely explanation for this default is the DOJ's
assessment that its political capital is ill-spent irritating a Congress
that believes the DOJ has been lax in prosecuting procurement fraud
and likely would object to DOJ efforts to gain dismissal of qui tam
suits on nonjurisdictional grounds.' In declining to challenge
substantively failed qui tam compliants, the DOJ has been a faithful
agent to legislators who desire expansive recourse to qui tam actions
and who are biased towards overenforcement rather than
underenforcement. Given the potential for welfare-reducing use of
qui tam monitoring, taxpayers would be better off if the DOJ
exercised its screening function more vigorously. For example, the
DOJ's skepticism would be appropriate when the Civil Division has
concluded that the underlying claim is baseless. Standing aside in
such cases is not costless for the government, as a defendant who
prevails can recover its legal fees as allowable costs under its
government contracts.'o A willingness to intervene to dismiss
177. Telephone Interview with Joseph Krovisky, supra note 14.
178. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
179. The chief Congressional proponents of qui tam enforcement have expressed doubts
about the DOJ's willingness to prosecute procurement fraud vigorously under the 1986
False Claims Act amendments. See, e.g., Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Abe Lincoln vs. The
Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1993, at 21 (op ed article by chief Senate sponsor
of 1986 False Claims Act amendments stating that "the Justice Department has been
consistently hostile to whistleblowers," and observing that "perhaps the executive branch
dislikes citizens interfering in the cozy relationships it has with defense companies and
other public contractors."); Moore, supra note 21, at 2010 (quoting Sen. Grassley as saying,
"'Just as somebody said war is too important to leave to the generals, so, too, with the
antifraud efforts,... [t]hey are too important to leave to the Justice Department.' ").
180. Where the government declines to intervene in a qui tam suit, the government has
taken the position that the allowability principles of FAR 31.205-47 apply to all defense
costs that the contractor continues to incur in responding to the relator's pursuit of his or
her claim. See DCAA Issues Guidance on Qui Tam Costs, CONT. MGMT., Nov. 1995, at
38 (reporting that the Defense Contract Audit Agency has issued a guidance document
that treats the costs of defending any qui tam suit, whether or not the government joins
the suit, as covered by FAR 31.205-47). The contractor cannot recover its defense costs
under FAR 31.205-47 unless it prevails against the relator's fraud claims. See supra note
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'foolish lawsuits would demonstrate the genuineness of the govern-
ment's desire to establish stronger "partnerships" between public
purchasing agencies and their suppliers.18 '
5. Fee and cost shifting
The 1986 qui tam reforms allow the defendant to shift the legal
fees and defense costs to the relator when the defendant proves that
the relator's suit was "clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought
primarily for purposes of harassment."" In practice this promises
to be a feeble constraint. Courts are likely to have a difficult time
determining whether a plaintiff's claims are "clearly frivolous,"
especially when the plaintiff makes the almost unverifiable assertion
that the lawsuit was filed on the basis of a good faith belief in the
defendant's culpability."8s To date, few qui tam defendants have
successfully invoked this provision.18
To discourage relator opportunism, the fee-shifting provisions of
the False Claims Act might be modified and made more symmetri-
cal."8s Specifically, when the DOJ concludes that the claims are
insufficiently robust to warrant the government's participation and the
relator decides to proceed independently, a successful defendant
should be permitted to charge the relator for all legal fees and
expenses incurred in responding to the relator's claims, without regard
160 and accompanying text. In United States ex rel. Butler v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.,
71 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1995), the DOJ declined to intervene in the relator's suit, and the
case proceeded to trial. ld. at 325. After a 10-day trial, the district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. The Ninth Circuit
subsequently affirmed. Id. at 329. The defendant's legal fees in preparing for and
conducting the trial and appeal could not have been trivial. If the DOJ's original decision
not to intervene reflected its assessment of the merits of the relator's claims, most of these
fees could have been avoided if the DOJ had moved to dismiss the case.
181. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
182. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (1994).
183. See Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation,
10 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 3,3-4 (1990).
184. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
185. There is considerable debate among scholars over the effects of fee-shifting upon
the inclination of private plaintiffs to file and pursue suits and upon the parties' willingness
to settle cases. Avery Katz doubts that adopting the English fee-shifting rule-the loser
pays the winner's legal costs-discourages the pursuit of frivolous suits. See Katz, supra
note 183, at 17. Edward Snyder and James Hughes find that the English rule of fee-
shifting tends to discourage settlement once cases are initiated, but such a standard may
reduce the inclination of plaintiffs to initiate suits. See Edward A. Snyder & James W.
Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 345, 377-78 (1990).
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to whether the suit is "clearly frivolous." the DOJ's decision not to
prosecute should create a presumption that the suit has limited value
to the government.'86 If the DOJ declines to intervene on the
relator's behalf, the cost to the relator of proceeding with a suit that
ultimately fails should be increased.
B. Attractiveness'of Alternative Regulatory Strategies
Whistleblower bounties constitute one of several oversight
strategies for solving pricing and quality monitoring problems that
arise in the government's principal-agent relationships with its
suppliers. Scholars have pointed out that a useful device for
evaluating public regulatory structures is to explore how private firms
attempt to solve problems that have close counterparts in public
regulation."8 In evaluating the qui tam mechanism, one can consid-
er how private firms deal with monitoring problems that arise in their
relationships with their suppliers. Private manufacturers presumably
would be pleased if employees of their input suppliers informed them
about quality deficiencies or intersupplier pricing conspiracies that
defy ready detection.
It does not appear that private manufacturers routinely alert the
employees of their input suppliers to the availability of bounties if
186. This suggestion makes the seemingly reasonable assumption that the government's
decision not to join a case generally is a reliable indication that the federal fraud claims
lack substantial merit. An examination of qui tam experience to date suggests that the
Justice Department's decision to participate or not participate is a sound proxy for the
quality of the relator's claims. The Justice Department has participated in 198 of the 1229
qui tam cases filed from 1986 through March 15, 1996. Telephone Interview with Joseph
Krovisky, supra note 14. Of the 198 cases in which the DOJ participated, 151 have been
completed by judgment or settlement and 47 remain in litigation. In 149 of the 151
completed matters, the DOJ succeeded in obtaining a False Claims Act recovery. Id. In
688 cases the DOJ declined to participate. Of the 688 matters, 463 cases were later
dismissed with no recovery for the relator, 31 cases yielded relator recoveries by judgment
or settlement, and 117 cases remain in litigation. The DOJ has achieved recoveries in
nearly 100% (149 out of 151) of the completed cases in which it participated, whereas
relators realized recoveries in only 6.3% (31 out of 494) of the completed cases in which
the DOJ declined to participate. The DOJ's recoveries in its 149 successful matters have
totaled nearly $1.06 billion, compared to total recoveries of roughly $16 million by relators
in the 31 cases in which they have succeeded where the DOJ declined to participate. This
assumption could undergo further empirical testing by studying cases that the Civil
Division declined to join to determine the reason for the government's refusal to
participate in and to independently assess the quality of the claims that proceeded without
the government's participation.
187. See Marvel & Marvel, supra note 157, at 1-2, 9-14; Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation
and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426, 433-34 (1976).
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such employees alert the manufacturer to instances of quality shirking,
price fixing, or other misconduct by their employer.1 However,
even without recourse to qui tam-like monitoring, private manufactur-
ers almost certainly attempt to obtain such information by other
means. One strategy is to hire employees of the manufacturer's
suppliers. Former employees can describe how faithfully an input
supplier-fulfilled contractual quality specifications and can identify
rumored or actual instances of apparent collusion among input
suppliers. Such information can be used to directly attack question-
able conduct and to improve the manufacturer's other monitoring
devices.
As an alternative to qui tam monitoring, public officials might
reassess the desirability of draconian limitations upon movements by
contractor employees into the public sector. As popularly conceived,
the "revolving door" has a dangerous tendency to damage public
procurement by corrupting the judgment of government officials who
aspire to positions with the firms they regulate, and by inhabiting
government agencies with private sector 6migr6s who consciously or
unconsciously make policy decisions that unduly favor industry
interests."8 Recent scholarship has suggested that loosening restric-
tions upon the revolving door can facilitate the formation and
execution of welfare-increasing, long-term regulatory contracts
between private firms and public agencies.Y Increasing the govern-
ment's ability to recruit contractor employees would provide an
alternative source of access to private information that is the target of
qui tam monitoring.
188. Some owners of intellectual property rights offer bounties to individuals who
report misappropriations of the owner's rights. Publishers of newsletters sometimes pay
rewards for proof of illegal photocopying. See Satellite News, Mar. 21, 1994, at 7 (offering
reward of up to $1000 to those who provide "conclusive evidence of illegal faxing or
photocopying"). Trade associations of software producers in recent years have offered
bounties to persons who identify illegal use of software. See Richard L. Hudson, Bounties
Offered For Reporting Of Software Piracy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1994, at B7 (reporting
that industry association of software manufacturers is offering a bounty of up to $3900 to
anyone in Britain who informs on companies that use unlicensed software).
189. See ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 119, at 338-40.
190. See Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency
Collusion, 26 RAND J. ECON. 378, 379-80, 393-94 (1995); David J. Salant, Behind the
Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 362,375-76
(1995).
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C. Choosing the Correct Liability Standard
Embracing decentralized enforcement demands careful consider-
ation of the underlying substantive standards that private monitoring
parties are allowed to police.' 91 A probing assessment of the
structure of commands to be enforced is essential because qui tam
enforcement eliminates prosecutorial discretion as an equilibriating
device by which public enforcement institutions mitigate the effects of
overly broad laws and regulations. One cannot decide whether
decentralization is wise or foolish without reference to the conduct
that is to be condemned. For example, scholarly criticism of private
antitrust enforcement would subside considerably if the private cause
of action applied only to horizontal price fixing, a form of conduct
that most antitrust scholars regard as posing severe competitive
hazards."9 Concern about strategic misuse of private enforcement in
antitrust is greatest where plaintiffs can attack conduct-for example,
mergers, distribution practices, and single-firm pricing decisions-that
frequently increases consumer welfare.' 93
In a number of instances, federal procurement regulations
proscribe conduct whose efficiency effects may be positive or, at
worst, neutral.194 Given the existing scheme of substantive conduct
requirements, qui tam monitoring sometimes elicits greater resources
to vindicate prohibitions of questionable wisdom. This suggests the
appropriateness of two modifications to the 1986 qui tam reforms.
The first and most ambitious approach is to examine the underlying
statutes and regulations and ruthlessly limit their scope to behavior
that unquestionably harms taxpayer interests. A second, more modest
undertaking is to carefully denominate categories of conduct that qui
191. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 10-16.
192. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 262-63 (1978) (discussing antitrust's per se ban against horizontal price fixing and
market division agreements and concluding that the rule's "contributions to consumer
welfare over the decades have been enormous").
193. See Baumol & Ordover, supra note 126, at 256-59; Edward A. Snyder & Thomas
E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551,
588-96 (1991).
194. See KENNETH L. ADELMAN & NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, THE DEFENSE
REVOLUTION: INTELLIGENT DOWNSIZING OF AMERICA'S MILITARY 170-74 (1990);
GANSLER, supra note 157, at 105-08; KELMAN, supra note 150, at 1; MCNAUGHER, supra
note 157, at 52-53; NPR REPORT, supra note 32, at 26-28; FRED THOMPSON & L.R. JONES,
REINVENTING THE PENTAGON: How THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT CAN BRING
INSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL 129-54 (1994).
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tam relators can attack. The qui tam cause of action might be
restricted, for example, to episodes of conduct such as double billing,
bid-rigging and product substitution. Policy makers should directly
reconsider whether so powerful a monitoring tool should be focused
upon all apparent departures from existing procurement controls.
D. Choosing the Correct Penalty
The remedial scheme of the False Claims Act derives much of its
power from the interaction of the statute's minimum penalties-$5000
to $10,000 per offense-and the nature of contractor conduct that can
create liability under the statute. Firms that engage in frequently
repeated activities that are covered by a certification can commit
hundreds of individual offenses if the behavior in question does not
strictly conform with the representations of the certification.
Deviation from the certified level of performance may impose trivial
economic harm on the government, but each event in which the
contractor fails to achieve complete compliance is a separately
punishable offense under the False Claims Act. The existing False
Claims Act minimum penalties promise to elicit costly efforts to
achieve strict compliance with these regulations. The possibility of
incurring massive liability provides a powerful incentive for contrac-
tors to ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements covered by
a certificate, no matter how poorly conceived such requirements might
be. Reducing excessive expenditures on compliance would entail
either eliminating regulatory controls that provide negligible economic
benefits to the government, or recalibrating the False Claims Act
penalties to track more closely the actual economic harm to the
government of violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1986 qui tam reforms sought to improve detection of
contractor misconduct and decrease reliance upon government
agencies to attack fraud. Enhanced bounty hunting incentives in
public procurement raise questions common to consideration of all
decentralized schemes for enforcing public laws: Compared to public
enforcement agencies, are the incentives of the deputized private
party better aligned with the interests of taxpayers? Does the
decentralized mechanism account for and control opportunism or
strategic misuse of litigation by the private plaintiff? Is the decentral-
ized mechanism superior to other regulatory strategies that might
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attain the same goals? Are the underlying substantive standards that
the private monitors will enforce well-conceived?
In principle, qui tam monitoring offers potential benefits, chiefly
in the form of encouraging detection of welfare-reducing behav-
ior-such as bid-rigging and product substitution-that might escape
detection by other means or would be discovered only through
comparatively more expensive devices such as audits and inspections.
In practice, qui tam monitoring appears to suffer from five basic flaws.
First, the 1986 reforms reveal little recognition of the full range
of ways in which the availability of qui tam suits could harmfully
distort the behavior of potential relators. For this and other reasons,
the qui tam mechanism provides inadequate disincentives for relators
to file meritless suits. Contractors and government agencies may be
able to compensate for this defect by using internal controls to
discourage some forms of employee opportunism. However, such
controls respond to only some of the scenarios for rent-seeking and
strategic behavior.
Second, the weakness of qui tam constraints upon relator conduct
is compounded by the Justice Department's refusal to perform
screening functions that the statute nominally contemplates. The
Department's unwillingness to seek dismissal of substantively weak
qui tam complaints removes a potentially important constraint upon
relator opportunism and a check against relator error in interpreting
events within the contractor's organization.
The third deficiency is deputization of private individuals and
companies to enforce substantive conduct requirements that vary
considerably in their efficiency consequences. The 1986 reforms do
not limit the qui tam cause of action to conduct with unambiguously
harmful efficiency effects. Among other remedies, the False Claims
Act imposes substantial minimum penalties on deviations from
statutory and regulatory requirements, regardless of their economic
impact on the government. Focusing qui tam monitoring upon
decidedly egregious conduct would curtail opportunism and direct
private enforcement efforts toward the most serious behavior.
The fourth flaw is the tendency to frustrate the attainment of
important contemporary procurement reform goals. Congress and the
Clinton Administration have committed themselves to making
government agencies emulate more closely the purchasing techniques
of private commercial actors and to nurturing the development of
"partnerships" between public buyers and private suppliers. There is
a fundamental contradiction between the existing False Claims Act
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qui tam mechanism and the transformation of public procurement
agencies into commercially-oriented buyers who operate through
collaborative relationships with suppliers. The fundamental contradic-
tion can be resolved only by abandoning the professed aim of having
the government function like a commercial purchaser or by making
major adjustments to the qui tam system. Such adjustments should
include retrenching the substantive legal commands that qui tam
monitoring is designed to enforce, excluding government employees
as relators, and establishing stronger disincentives for relators to
behave strategically in ways that injure taxpayer interests.
Finally, implementation of the 1986 reforms has proceeded
without consideration of whether other regulatory strategies may
achieve the qui tam mechanism's efficiency aims, but at lower cost
and without the distortions in relator behavior that accompany the qui
tam incentive structure. Such strategies might usefully be derived
from examining how large commercial firms detect and punish
misconduct by their customers and input suppliers.
Major additions to public procurement regulation often occur
without systematic assessment of costs and benefits of existing or
contemplated regulatory controls.95 Assessing the seriousness of
concerns about qui tam monitoring requires further study of individual
qui tam complaints and litigation episodes, as well as efforts to
measure the internal institutional effects of decentralized enforcement
upon the operation of government contractors and government
agencies. Such analysis poses formidable data collection and
assessment problems, but it is precisely the type of ex-post empirical
evaluation that is necessary for policy makers to appraise the wisdom
of the 1986 qui tam reforms.
A careful empirical assessment of the effects of the False Claims
Act qui tam mechanism could have implications that extend well
beyond the field of public procurement. If empirical analysis showed
that the existing equilibrium of qui tam doctrine and enforcement
yielded substantial net benefits to society, it could spur a far-reaching
reassessment of the approach used to enforce numerous other legal
commands. If expansive qui tam enforcement is sensible for
government procurement, one might ask why it should not be adopted
broadly for any number of other statutory schemes. Why, for
195. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do
AND WHY THEY Do IT 323-25 (1989).
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example, should persons who detect violations of environmental
statutes not be allowed to share in penalties that the government
recovers? Why should standing to prosecute violations for employ-
ment discrimination statutes not be extended to individuals other than
the victim? Should we give individual government officials the ability
to bring suits on behalf of the public when the agencies that employ
them decline to prosecute apparent violations of the law? If we
distrust the government's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the
enforcement of public procurement laws, why should we tolerate it in
other fields? In short, if robust decentralized bountyhunting makes
sense for government contracting because it facilitates superior
detection, punishment, and deterrence of illegal conduct, there seems
little reason not to adopt such a mechanism for enforcing virtually all
other legal commands.
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